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This thesis explores Navy responses to Congressional
control as illustrated by the acquisition of the A-6F
aircraft. Congress exercises control through the procedures
of authorization, appropriation and oversight activities.
Navy responds to control by program design,
justification, financial manipulation and actions to
influence Congressional deliberations. A policy
implementation model extrapolated from the work of Bardach
is developed for application to the A-6F acquisition.
Findings that relate to Congressional controls are the
dissipation of energy in attempting to control budget
implementation decisions and the opportunism and
fragmentation in Congressional decision making. Findings
that apply to Navy responses to control are the inclusion of
technical and political elements in program construction,
the combination of factors to terminate programs and the
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Weapons systems upgrading and improvement is an ongoing
concern in the Navy. In order to meet perceived threats to
national security, the armed forces must replace outmoded,
worn, or useless capital assets: weapons, ships, aircraft.
Due to the complex technological nature of today's weaponry,
planners draft detailed strategies for managing and
controlling key variables against which the acquisition of
specific systems will be judged as a success or failure.
Delivery schedules, performance standards and costs are the
usual variables controlled to achieve successful acquisition
program execution. Decision makers continually face
tradeoffs, e.g. building in more capability or pushing ahead
delivery schedules at increasing cost.
There are numerous other aspects to successful program
implementation. The Navy is both the initiator and executor
of projects. This characterization yields a measure of
autonomy, but the Navy still must seek assistance from other
governmental bodies to bring an acquisition plan to
fruition. From the Office of the Secretary of Defense
(OSD) , it receives formal approval of budgets and
integration of its budget requests into the Presidential
administration's military, economic, and foreign policy
goals. From Congress, the Navy receives broad political
support and continued funding. Therefore, the service must
define, defend and execute acquisition programs in such a
manner that achieves collective desired outcomes. The
political context of the Navy's acquisition of weapons
systems is much larger than manipulation of cost, schedule,
and performance.
Since 1983, the Navy has been developing two medium
attack aircraft for carrier operations as replacements for
an aging weapon system. One is a variant of the A-6
aircraft, originally introduced in 1963 and upgraded 5 times
previously. The sixth and newest version is called the
A-6F. The other replacement is the Advanced Tactical
Aircraft (ATA). It employs newer technologies to meet the
kind of combat operations envisaged in the late 1990' s and
beyond. But the earliest this latter aircraft can enter the
fleet is 1995. Given the riskiness of meeting the necessary
cost, performance, and scheduling factors. Navy planners
feel that date has a significant probability of not being
met
.
The A-6F is a bridge to the ATA. The A-6F uses the same
airframe as previous models, but also employs newer
armaments, sensors, and avionics controls. Full scale
engineering development ha? been completed, and in the FY 88
budget submission, the Navy requested procurement funds for
the first purchase of 12 airplanes.
In November 1987, Congress disagreed with the rationale
for developing and purchasing two different attack aircraft.
In the FY 88 Defense Authorization Act, it refused to
authorize continued expenditures for the A-6F. But in
December 1987, Congress appeared to reverse that decision.
In an omnibus appropriation act for the entire Federal
Government in FY 88, it agreed to the initial purchase.
Due to Congressional conflict, the Navy was uncertain
about what aircraft it had both authority and funds to
purchase. Initially it appeared it might proceed with both
the A-6F and the ATA. Powerful members of Congress then
expressed their displeasure with this decision [Ref. l:p.
28]. In February 1988, Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucci
announced that further funding of the A-6F would not be
sought in the FY 89 budget. This, in effect, terminated the
program. The Navy is now seeking alternatives to the A-6F,
This dichotomy of action on the part of Congress
highlights a unique system of legislating national programs.
Congress authorizes programs through substantive
legislation, setting upper limits to expenditures. In
theory, this step allows for consideration of the relative
merits of the program, before it is reviewed as part of the
budget. The next step is to appropriate funds for
authorized programs, for Congress to allow monies to be
drawn from the Treasury for programs previously authorized;
in many cases the sum appropriated is below the limit in the
authorizing legislation. Again, in theory, the purpose of
the appropriation decision is to evaluate the specifics of
each line item of the budget submission in order to verify
the accuracies of cost projections, the budgetary priority
of the project relative to others, and the executabil i ty of
programs proposed at funding levels requested.
This two-step process is only one of the control
mechanisms by which Congress influences the formulation and
implementation of national defense policy. Additional
control mechanisms include Congressional oversight,
investigative hearings, reporting requirements, and
legislated procedural steps in the acquisition process.
When the process does not work as it is supposed to,
according to law, as in the A-6F acquisition case, it raises
questions about how issues should be resolved between the
executive and the legislature, and also within Congress.
Another problem is the appropriateness of outcomes from the
control process. Do controls slow down production or add
additional cost to programs? Do they alter relationships
between the Navy and Congress? Do they change decision
making mechanisms within DOD? The issue of the appropriate
level of Congressional control is open to debate.
Nonetheless, the Navy must adapt to it in order to formulate
and execute budgets for national defense programs.
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
The following questions are researched in this thesis.
- What is the nature, scope and intent of Congressional
budget control implemented through legislative,
budgetary, and oversight activities?
- What is the nature, scope and impact of the Navy's
responses to budget control?
- What specific responses has the Navy made to
Congressional attempts to influence the management of
the A-6F acquisition program?
- What lessons has the Navy learned from Congressional
review and oversight of the A-6F acquisition program?
C. RESEARCH SCOPE, LIMITATIONS AND ASSUMPTIONS
Implementation of national defense policy may be viewed
as an ongoing process in which the Navy seeks support from
the other services, from the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS)
,
from OSD, from the President and Office of Management and
Budget (0MB), and from Congress. Examples of these support
elements include funding, formal review and approval of
programs, political advocacy, logistic support, and
participation in planning and design. This thesis studies
Congressional controls as an expression of its growing
desire to influence Executive programmatic outcomes. The
intent of this study is to identify Congressional control
capacities employed in budgeting, passage of substantive
legislation, and oversight, and to relate these controls to
Navy efforts to implement national defense policies.
Specifically, the question is how did the Navy develop and
administer the A-6F aircraft program in light of
Congressional assertions of power and authority?
The Navy, OSD, and Congress are not the only
institutions involved in defense policy implementation.
Others include the defense industry, private individuals,
and other various interest groups. All contribute or
withhold certain elements that interlock in the formulation
of successful policy execution. An exhaustive analysis
would address all institutions. Only the Navy, OSD, and
Congress are analyzed in this paper.
The Budget Act of 1974 altered the existing scheme for
Congressional budgeting by overlaying new institutions and
procedures on the old. Although Congressional Budget
Committees, created by this legislation, deliberate taxes
and spending by reconsidering many of the same issues as the
substantive and appropriation committees, this role is not
discussed. Concurrent resolutions, reconciliation,
impoundment and sequestration are similarly beyond the scope
of this presentation. The focus of this thesis is on the
authorization and appropriation decision processes of
Congress
.
The assumptions of the research are:
- The reader has working knowledge of DOD's Planning,
Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS)
.
- The reader knows the background of the Congressional
Budget Impoundment and Control Act of 1974 and its
impact upon Congressional budget procedures.
- The reader is familiar with the Federal Government's
budget terminology.
D. METHODOLOGY
The methodology used was archival research of Federal
statutes. Congressional testimony, printed media reports, as
well as interviews of Department of the Navy and Department
of Defense personnel in decision-making positions within the
A-6F program.
E. SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS
The conclusions are grouped in three categories.
1
.
Conclusions Regarding Congressional Control
- Congress dissipates political energy in excessive
control of Executive budget decisions.
- Members of Congress are opportunistic in advancing their
own agendas in budget negotiation and oversight.
- Congressional micromanagemen t leads to unintended
effects in the Department of Defense. Some of these
effects appear to impede the efficiency of the Executive
branch of government.
- Congress makes fragmented decisions instead of unified
judgments in negotiating and controlling the Department
of Defense acquisition budget.
2 Conclusions Regarding Navy Responses to
Congressional Control
- The Navy must match technical justifications with
political strategies to promote programs effectively
before Congress.
- Under circumstances where projects are discontinued by
Congress, Navy programs appear to be terminated by a
combination of constraints in the political process
rather than as a result of a single decision.
- Measures of programmatic success and failure are
distorted in the political process due to the emphasis
placed upon resource inputs instead of the intended
outputs of national defense.
3 . Conclusions Regarding the A-6F Acquisition
- The A-6F case illustrates the multiple strategy
requirements of program negotiation and implementation
within the highly politicized environment of Department
of Defense, Executive and Congressional budget decision
making
.
- The A-6F case illustrates budget and control problems
with the Congressional two-step authorization/
appropriation enactment of budgets,
- The A-6F case illustrates the politics of program
survival and failure.
F. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY
Chapter Two details some of the controls used by
Congress to regulate defense asset acquisition. These are
broadly defined in two categories: budget formulation
through the authorization and appropriation process, and
budget execution oversight through activities such as
hearings, investigations, and reports of "watchdog"
agencies. Chapter III identifies how the Navy constructs
policies and programs to assure their survival and
successful execution. These responses to controls are
institutional and programmatic in nature; the effects are
exhibited in Navy organizational structure, program
construction, and legislative strategies. A model of
program implementation, adapted from one developed by
Bardach [Ref, 2:pp. 36-37], is used as a theoretical
framework for describing Navy, OSD, and Congressional
interaction. Chapter Four presents the A-6F aircraft
program as an illustration of how Congress influences the
Navy's implementation of national defense policies. Chapter
Five analyzes the impact of Congressional controls and
presents the major findings of this study.
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II. CONGRESSIONAL CONTROL MECHANISMS
Budgeting is a political process, a means to arrive at
decisions through bargaining, compromise, and rules of
procedure. As Wildavsky illuminates in The New Politics of
the Budgetary Process , a budget serves many purposes: a
prediction of future events, a mechanism for making choices,
a statement of goals, and a contract between Congress and
the Executive to spend appropriated monies for authorized
purposes .[ Ref . 3:pp. 1-3]. Budgeting is also intended to be
policy formulation. These diverse aims suggest the
difficulties that arise in building budgets, i.e.,
achieving agreement on the types of future events, the
choices, the goals, the terms of the contract and the shape
of policy. Politics serves to reconcile the many purposes
intended in the budget. Because policy formulation and
implementation are linked through the budget, control of the
implementation process also is political in nature.
Management control and implementation are the same process
viewed from different perspectives.
Two Congressional control processes are analyzed in this
chapter: procedural review in budget formulation and
oversight of budget execution. Procedural review is the
formal means for deliberating and enacting program and
spending legislation into law. Authorization and
appropriation are the two step process used since 1924 to
judge the worthiness of programs and to fund operations.
Oversight is the term used to describe the variety of
activities of Congress that delve into Executive budget
implementation and management efficiency. There is
considerable conjecture over appropriateness and
effectiveness of these mechanisms.
A. PROCEDURAL REVIEW IN BUDGET FORMULATION
1 . Authorization
The committee structure of Congress is prescribed in
the standing rules for each chamber. In accordance with
these prescriptions, authorization of appropriations is
under the purview of the Armed Services Committees of the
respective chambers. For the Senate, Rule XXV provides that
all proposed legislation, messages, petitions, memorials, as
well as matters relating to the common defense, the
Department of Defense and its subordinate departments,
military research and development, the selective service
system, military personnel benefits, and other national
defense issues, shall be referred to the SASC. The SASC is
also tasked to "study and review, on a comprehensive basis,
matters relating to the common defense policy of the United
States, and report thereon from time to time." [Ref. 4:p.
19] The SASC also reviews presidential appointments to the
Department of Defense. In exercising this authority, it is
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empowered to authorize appropriations, call or subpoena
witnesses, hold hearings, conduct investigations, and
recommend statutory nominations to the Senate. The HASC has
similar authority and power, embodied in Standing Rule X of
the House, except for the privilege to review appointments
[Ref . 5:pp. 350-351] .
The committees are divided into subcommittees to
further delve into programmatic and functional budget areas
and issues. But, since 1981 the subcommittees of the HASC
and SASC have a significantly different alignment and a
somewhat contradictory viewpoint (See Appendix A) . The HASC
subcommittees are arrayed by a combination of appropriation
account and mission area. The SASC subcommittees are
divided completely along mission lines. These differing
types of organization are meaningful in the context of
debate on defense priorities. Since the President's budget
is presented both in traditional appropriation format as
well as in programmatic terms, organization determines, to a
great extent, the nature of deliberation. In theory, the
HASC, when reviewing its subcommittees' work, is in a
position to look for redundancy of effort in DOD programs.
Meanwhile, the SASC can better consider policy tradeoffs to
achieve defense outputs. Because of the complexity of
defense budget analysis, it is advantageous to both
committees to divide the tasks of review and oversight as
much as possible. But the result is to make coherent policy
11
analysis more difficult to achieve because subcommittees'
and committees' decisions will be biased by their point of
reference. Their functions influence the nature and scope
of their deliberations. [Ref. 6:p. 583].
Committees and subcommittees are also divided along
partisan lines. The party leadership of each chamber has
the right to name the representation to each committee. The
partisan composition of committees roughly reflects the
relative standings within each chamber. The committee
chairman is chosen by the committee itself; custom dictates
that the choice be made from the majority party. This
divergence of political parties extends into many facets of
committee and subcommittee procedures and activities
including the hiring of committee staff, the inclusion of
minority views in reports, and the requirement for
consultation with the minority before major decisions are
announced. To the extent that parties will be distinguished
by their political philosophies, the role of government, and
the specifics of policy implementation, committees' and
subcommittees' activities will be affected by partisanship.
Title 10 US Code, Section 138, lists the 9
categories of defense expenditure that require authorization
before appropriation. The evolution of the law has meaning
for a study of Congressional controls. Prior to 1959, the
HASC and SASC authorized activities on a permanent basis,
allowing the Appropriation Committees to decide on annual
12
funding levels. Since that time, over 90% of the defense
budget has gradually been enveloped by annual authorization
(see Appendix B) [Ref. 6
: pp . 574-576].
There are a number of opinions concerning the
reasons for the growth of annual authorization. Some
scholars portray the Armed Services and Appropriation
Committees defending their jurisdictions as defined in the
standing rules of each chamber. A classical treatment of
the conflict pits Armed Services in the guise of advocates
of programs and increasing spending, against Appropriations,
who are bulwarks against raids upon the Treasury [Ref.
3:pp. 95-100]. But, responding to their perceptions of the
mandate, each committee feels that it is not implementing
its responsibilities unless it guards against intrusions
into its prerogatives. Thus the growth of annual
authorization is a defensive maneuver, protecting the powers
of the Armed Services from usurpation by Appropriations.
[Ref. 7:p. 153] Others have stressed that Congress has
increasingly desired to force changes in defense policy upon
an Executive unwilling to seek Congressional consultation
[Ref. 6:p. 576]. Still others point out the offensive clash
of wills between Armed Services and Appropriation Committees
to decide which body will wield the most influence [Ref.
8:pp. 227-248]. In addition, the yearly process of
authorizing DOD's programs enhances individual members'
13
ability to craft legislation to the benefit of their
constituents
.
Although explanations for the process vary, the
process itself is remarkably similar in both houses. After
receipt of the President's budget in January, authorization
legislation is introduced as separate bills in the House and
Senate. The review proceeds simultaneously in both
chambers, beginning with hearings at the subcommittee and
full committee level, legislative mark-up, committee vote
and reporting out to the appropriate chamber. Then comes
floor action and vote, joint conference to resolve
differences, and lastly, final vote and delivery to the
President for signature into law. (The timetable, as
specified in the Standing Rules of the Senate, is presented
in Appendix C) . Each step in this process is explained more
fully below.
Hearings traditionally begin in February each year
before the entire Senate and House Armed Services and
Appropriation Committees. The first witnesses are the
Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the JCS, the
individual service secretaries and the service chiefs. They
remark, in general terms, on the posture of the defense
establishment, highlights of operations of the preceding
year, and notable programs in the new budget proposal. Each
witness usually opens with a short 20 minute oral statement,
discussing significant aspects of a prepared written
14
statement. Typically, longer testimony then follows,
illustrated with slides or other visual aids that are
duplicated in the printed transcript. Next, a question and
answer session allows each member to query the witness. If
a member asks a question for which the witness does not have
the information immediately available, an answer is later
inserted "for the record". Members also can request answers
to written questions, which are appended to the testimony.
Through March and early April each year, hearings
before the various subcommittees, follow a similar course.
Representatives from OSD and the services, with
responsibility for specific programs, testify in further
detail about budgetary line items. For example, if
procurement programs are on the agenda, the initial witness
will usually be the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Procurement. Then separate hearings will be held for each
service's program, further broken down as to appropriation
type. DOD resource sponsors and the heads of the
acquisition agencies "go up to the Hill" to defend the
budget. For air programs, the Commander of the Naval Air
Systems Command (NAVAIR) (as head of acquisition)
accompanies the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Air
Warfare {OP-05) (the resource sponsor) to testify about
aircraft and air weapons acquisition. Often, the committees
and subcommittees request the appearance of certain
witnesses. Thus, not only do the immediate aides accompany
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the flag officers, but also so do program managers who can
answer questions about their particular programs.
The atmosphere of hearings appears at times to be
somewhat chaotic. Staff and members arrive and leave the
room during testimony. The proceedings can be interrupted
by bells for quorum calls or votes on the floor of the
respective chamber. Not all of the members may be present
at once, either due to schedule conflicts or even lack of
interest. Nevertheless, at least two members of the
committee or subcommittee will be present to form a quorum.
[Ref. 9:pp. 45-48]
By late April, in a year that runs according to
typical schedule, hearings are completed on the
authorization bill. The committee commences markup of the
budget request. Markup sessions resemble hearings, but
without witnesses. A committee staff member will read each
line item, with a recommended funding level. If there is no
objection, staff will read the next item. If there is an
objection, a vote of the membership is required. The
outcome of the session is that each line item has been read
and the committees recommendation is recorded to either
accept the request, mark the request up or down, or
eliminate the item entirely. Markup may take several days,
and members consider the period quite strenuous, [Ref.
10:pp. 43-44] .
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The result of hearings and markup sessions is a
committee report on the military authorization bill to the
appropriate house, issued usually in early May. The report
clearly documents where changes in funding levels have been
recommended (See Appendix D) . The report also explains the
rationale behind the rejection of the budget request, and
the logic behind the committee's decision. The report
incorporates minority views on funding issues in an
appendix. Perhaps as a result of the complexity of the
defense budget, or of the changes wrought by the
authorization committees, the reports may be 500 pages or
longer
.
The next step is for full floor deliberation of the
legislation. This may not occur for a month or more after
the committee report is issued. As scheduled by the
majority leadership in each house, time is set aside for
reading of the bill, debate, and consideration of
amendments. Usually, several blocks of days are reserved
for this task. Debate may proceed for three or four hours
in the morning for three days, then break for three days,
followed by three days of more debate. Amendments require
either a voice vote or a recorded vote for approval or
rejection. A simple majority decides the issue. Once the
last amendment has been considered, the entire proposal is
voted on by the chamber.
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Typically, the process has fallen behind the review
timetable set in the standing rules of each chamber. In
practice, by late August the House has finished its
authorization bill before the Senate. The Senate may amend
the title of its legislation to reflect the House resolution
number, but otherwise diverge in funding levels and programs
authorized. A joint conference, between the House and
Senate, is convened to resolve the differences.
A joint conference can only consider matters
referred to it by their respective chambers [Ref. 4:p. 39,
Ref . 5:pp. 654-673] Conferees, ostensibly nominated by the
leadership, but in reality picked by the chairman of the
HASC and SASC, meet to bring the legislation into agreement.
Subconf erences , divided by budget functional area (e.g.,
procurement) , are convened; there is a considerable amount
of "horsetr ading" on each line item and provision that
varies between the two bills. What emerges is a Conference
Report detailing the original budget request, the House and
Senate floor action, and the conference recommendation.
Furthermore, as in the committee reports, the conference
usually divulges its logic for adopting a particular
position. The likelihood that reports contain
justifications for committee decisions is linked to several
factors: the sum of money involved, the political
contentiousness of the issue, the need to influence votes
18
for passage, and the desire to maintain an open political
systein
.
The conference report finally returns for action in
both houses. Proceedings take the form of adoption of
changes made to the bill as passed by each chamber.
Amendment is not allowed [Ref. 4:p. 39, Ref. 5:p. 662],
Failure to adopt a change sends the report back to
conference for more deliberation. An affirmative vote by
both houses authorizes and transmits the bill to the
President for signature or veto.
The legislation produced by the authorization
process in recent years contained more than formal approval
of programs and ceilings for the appropriation of funds.
For example, the FY 86 Defense Authorization Act mandated 91
reports and studies, established new acquisition procedures
and regulations, specified the general information to be
contained in routine acquisition reports to Congress,
asserted new personnel management policies, and also
expressed the sense of Congress on a myriad of issues such
as the construction of ships for NATO allies in U.S.
shipyards. It also constrained DOD operations, from
freezing the size of the service's headquarters staffs to
prohibiting the removal of Basic Point Defense Missile
Systems from Navy amphibious ships. It contained 16 titles
divided into 298 sections; total page length 197 pages. The
breadth of subject matter contained in the legislation, all
19
of which passed through the previously described process of
deliberation, indicates the reliance of Congress upon
authorization as a major controlling device over DOD.
2 . Appropriation
The Congressional budget process is designed to
provide authorization before appropriation. However, often
this is not the case. Appropriation parallels authorization
in time, but typically is divergent in substance and
sequence of review. The authority of the Senate
Appropriations Committee (SAC) is derived from Senate
Standing Rule XXV, as is that of the SASC. Limiting the
sac's power to review amounts of new spending authority, is
Standing Rule XVI [Ref. 4 : pp . 11-12] It states that no
amendment to add a new item of appropriation may be made
unless it carries out a provision of existing law. Further,
the SAC shall not report an appropriation bill proposing new
or general legislation, or a restriction upon expenditure of
funds not authorized by law. The intent to prohibit
appropriation without previous authorization is evident.
The rules for the House Appropriations Committee (HAC) are
similar. [Ref. 4:p. 573]
An additional constraint upon both Committees is the
Joint Budget Resolution, a procedure instituted by the
Budget Act of 1974 that sets spending and revenue caps upon
broad categories, such as defense, foreign aid, and domestic
programs. The legislative calendar also contracts the
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Appropriation Committees' flexibility to alter spending.
The rules provide that the joint resolution be voted by 15
April, empowering the House to begin consideration of the
appropriation bills. Thus Appropriations Committees find
themselves fenced within the restrictions of authorizations
and the Joint Budget Resolution.
The appropriations committees of both houses also
are subdivided into subcommittees (see Appendix A). This
guarantees some commonality of knowledge and viewpoint in
their deliberations. The procedures of hearings, testimony
and markup are similar to those of the authorizing
committees. The thrust of the questioning is the evaluation
of dollar amounts for programs, especially the validity of
estimates made by the services. Hearings are conducted for
groupings of appropriation accounts, but separately for each
service. Thus, it is standard for a cluster of similar
appropriations (e.g.. Operations and Maintenance for the
active and reserve forces for an individual service) to be
considered at the same time, with the hearing room filled
with the necessary witnesses.
Markup and reporting are similar in procedure for
appropr iators as well as authorizers. In the past,
appropriations were traditionally divided into thirteen
spending bills for the entire federal government. Thus, the
HAC and SAC issued thirteen separate reports. However, in
the mid-1980' s for a variety of reasons, this custom has
21
been ignored in favor of wrapping all bills into one omnibus
appropriation act. As during appropriations, detailed
explanation of changes from the budget request, as well as
rationale for the deviation, may be provided in the Joint
Conference Report, Finally, floor action, conference
action, and final adoption are required to enact an
appropriation bill into law.
3 . Budget Enactment Detours
The limited presentation of the budget formulation
process conveys some of the awkwardness of Congressional
budget deliberations. Further complicating the process are
the role of the budget committees, the Budget Resolution,
reconciliation, and other aspects of the Budget Act of 1974.
The budget committees review revenue, credit and
spending projections provided to them by their own staff and
the authorization and appropriation committees and recommend
targets for each. Congressional agreement is embodied in a
joint resolution (the Budget Resolution) of the House and
Senate; its passage precedes the two-step authorization/
appropriation process. Reconciliation is the means for
enforcement of the Budget Resolution targets.
Authorization, appropriation and revenue committees are
obliged to report a reconciliation bill if required by the
budget resolution or subsequently in budget enactment.
Recommended changes are provided in the resolution, although
the committees are free to change existing law as necessary
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to match the targets. The Budget Committees also perform
"scorekeeping" by comparing spending in proposed substantive
and appropriation legislation as it is considered by
authorization and appropriation committees with the agreed
upon targets and totals of the Budget Resolution. Bills
that entail excessive spending can be referred back to the
reporting committee. How is the determination of "excessive
spending" made? In practice, the House has been less rigid
than the Senate, voting not to control spending by the
target limitations but by first categorizing spending as
uncontrollable or discretionary. Excessive discretionary
spending has been referred back to the reporting committee,
[Ref. ll:p. 46]
These features render the process even more complex,
even though they are designed to improve Congressional
control over excessive spending. Budget resolution,
authorization, appropriation, and reconciliation are not
enacted in accordance with the schedule. As 1 October
approaches, the beginning of the fiscal year, every agency
anxiously awaits new spending authority. Typically,
Congress has not met the budget deadline for all Executive
agencies since 1977. In response, the presidential
administration has threatened to order a cessation to
routine governmental functions until Congress provides some
type of funding. Continuing Resolution Authority is a
detour around the impasse.
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This hybrid legislation bears the stamp of
contentiousness and haste, to "do something" to keep the
Government operating if annual authorization and
appropriation actions are incomplete. The interim measure
legally authorizes funding for existing annual programs, at
the same funding level as the previous year. In effect, it
delays Congressional authorization and funding for proposed
new program starts. Because the life of a CRA is measured
in weeks or days, there may be several CRA's before passage
of the final authorization and spending acts. Some form of
continuing resolution authority has been required at the
start of every fiscal year for DOD since 1 October 1976.
Closely allied with CRA is the omnibus funding bill,
the wrapping of several, or all appropriation bills into one
mammoth legislative vehicle for final and transmission to
the president. Passage and presidential signature of an
omnibus appropriation act is almost a forgone conclusion
because of the drastic consequences of failure to pass it; a
veto halts the operation of the government, creates the
requirement to bring forth another interim CRA, and/or the
necessity to try for a veto override. Presidential anger at
this budget strategy was revealed when President Reagan
vowed in his 1988 State of the Union address to not sign
such a measure in his last year in office [Ref. 12: p. 4].
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4 . The Role of Staff
The role of congressional committee staff in budget
deliberation needs to be examined separately because their
influence is pervasive in all congressional procedures.
Excluding the staff of the Congressional Budget Office,
there are two types of staff, personal staff of the
congressman or senator, and professional staff working
directly for committees.
Personal staff are hired by the member. Due to the
limits placed upon the size of staff by the standing rules,
few members can afford to hire specialists dedicated to one
issue. The House allows up to 18 staffers for its members;
there is a total payroll limitation in the Senate. Personal
staff tend to be young, fresh out of college, without
graduate degrees, and eager to make their mark. They
closely follow issues of interest to their employer, draft
responses to constituent's letters, seek information by
inquiry, write speeches and compose testimony. They may
work for the member for only a year or two. [Ref. 9:p. 29].
Professional staff of the committees are more
permanent. Their loyalty belongs to the committee, although
the committee chair most likely has hired them. In addition
to the bill mark-up described above, their jobs are to draft
legislation, draw up amendments, write queries for
information from DOD, organize hearings and witnesses and
conduct extensive studies of defense related issues. In the
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House, they are allowed to question witnesses at hearings;
this privilege is not extended to the professional staff in
the Senate. They tend to be older (average age 40), with
advanced degrees in law. Some are retired military. [Ref,
10:p. 19]
The power of the professional staffs has been
documented by others. They have been referred to as a
"shadow government", working behind the scenes to shape
national policy. As individuals, their influence upon
members is profound [Ref. 13:p. 13]. One Navy liaison
officer commented that they can literally tell the members
what can and cannot be done in constructing legislation or
drafting strategies for parliamentary maneuvers [Ref. 14].
Increasingly, both types of staffs interact with DOD action
officers and program managers. As the complexity of budgets
grows, so does the power of staffs to analyze and interpret
issues for members, and to propose alternatives. Members'
time is limited and thus they must rely increasingly on
staff to review budget and program detail.
Committees can use investigative staff, including
the General Accounting Office (GAO) , to delve deeply into
specific DOD programs prior to subcommittee review.
Although this function is more related to program oversight
than review, GAO surveys are relatively short term
evolutions, instigated at the request of a member. From
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DOD's perspective, GAO is interested in both the good and
bad aspects of a program:
Their reports are occasionally complimentary, constructive
and helpful where the cases warrant. Also, GAO is now
operating in "real time," reporting findings back to the
originator qu ickly. .
.
(DOD program managers) should realize
GAO investigators probably have an idea of what is going
on before going out to look at a program. [Ref. 9:p. 70]
B. OVERSIGHT
"Continuous watchfulness" is the term used in the
Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 that directed
committees to pursue oversight over agencies and programs
within their jurisdiction [Ref. 9:p. 60]. Reaffirmed by
court opinion, the power of Congress to review the
implementation and the affects of legislation is firmly
entrenched in all Congressional committees [Ref. 15:p. 4].
Congress requests DOD to supply information through the
testimony of witnesses at hearings, written or telephonic
inquiry, briefings, or the submission of special reports and
studies. Such reports supplement the over 21,000 pages in
the justification books transmitted with the budget. DOD
has held that the sum total of these requests constitutes an
overly onerous burden (See Appendix E) . The means for
gathering information is through hearings, reports, and the




Hearings play a central role in oversight, since
many of the members questions concern ongoing programs.
Oversight hearings are usually combined with those for
substantive legislation. Hearings before the HASC in 1987
were titled "Hearings on National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Years 1988/1989 - H.R. 1748 and Oversight of
Previously Authorized Programs" [Ref. 16].
Congress also investigates agency operations and
programs as a part of oversight. They subpoena witnesses
and documents, hear sworn testimony, and issue findings.
Private citizens or officials of the executive branch not
cooperating by supplying information, can be found in
contempt. DOD ' s own advice to its program managers explains
what to expect in an investigation:
The fact an investigation is called is apt to discredit
DOD and bring adverse publicity. The position of Congress
is "we are doing our job to look into this," thus accruing
a degree of favorable publicity. It is not so much the
form or substance of an investigative hearing that
separates it from a regular one as it is the inevitable
tone or climate of the proceedings. Whereas hearing
witnesses or those being interviewed or otherwise asked to
provide information are not expected to be public
relations specialists, still the admonishment remains:
don't panic, don't become defensive, stick to the facts,
be candid, and try to assume a positive public relations
attitude and approach. [Ref. 9:p. 69]
2
.
General Accounting Office/Congressional Budget
Office
As noted previously under the role of staff.
Congress also makes use of so-called "watchdog" agencies, in
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particular, the General Accounting Office (GAO) . At the
request of any member of Congress, it has the power to
investigate, survey, or review program implementation. At
its own initiation, it conducts routine periodic audit of
government operations, focusing on programs with a history
of trouble, ones that have been significantly restructured,
or ones over which partisan competition is intense. GAO has
shed its old image as a group of accountants who audited
federal programs for accurate accounting practices. They
have many specialists in defense issues who examine mission
requirements, test results, and whether statutes and the
intent of Congress are being executed properly. They also
use outside technical consultants when needed. [Ref. 9:p.
70] GAO issued 749 reports in 1987; 162 concerned DOD.
Congress also relies on the Congressional Budget
Office (CBO) to study DOD. The CBO was created by the 1974
Budget Reform Act as an independent provider of budgetary
analysis to Congress [Ref. 17:pp. 302-303]. Before 1974,
Congress laclced the resources comparable to those provided
to the executive branch by 0MB and the Council of Economic
Advisers. Congress did not believe that the analysis
accompanying the President's annual budget proposal would be
free from partisan manipulation. The intent was to set up a
rival organization, loyal to the institution of Congress
rather than beholding to committees or political parties.
[Ref. 3:p. 143]
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Initially, CBO reviewed the administration's
estimates for economic parameters, such as inflation,
unemployment, and interest rates. These led to forecasts of
anticipated revenues and expenditures under a variety of
different budgets. It now reviews the President's budget
and assesses alternatives, recommending changes in some
instances. As legislation enters mark-up, CBO provides
input to the decision. It also keeps score on the
difference between projected outlays and expenditures of
authorizations, appropriations, and the budget resolution.
[Ref. 3:p. 198] In effect, CBO now presents a series of
alternatives to the President's budget. Its demonstrated
accuracy vis-a-vis 0MB lent legitimacy to its claims of
independence. Increasingly, Congress has requested special
studies and analysis of defense issues. One example is
Assessing the Effectiveness of Milestone Budgeting , a July
1987 study to consider ways to improve the efficiency of
acquiring weapon systems [Ref. 18].
3 . Reporting Requirements to Congress
In addition to tasking other agencies to report on
DOD, Congress tasks DOD to report on itself. The
Congressional appetite for reports and information is
insatiable. The FY 80 Authorization Act required 15 special
reports or studies, in addition to routine transmissions; by
1986, the demand increased to 91 special one-time reports
[Ref. 19:pp. 803-820, Ref. 20:pp. 583-779]. Secretary of
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Defense Weinberger considered the effort and cost to answer
and prepare these requests for information so significant
that he made objection to it a key part of his posture
statement to Congress in 1985 [Ref. 21]. Congress
subsequently ordered GAO to prepare an analysis of
Congressional reporting requirements. [Ref. 22]
In the area of acquisitions. Congress has received
routine reports about costs and performance since 1969.
Here also, there has been an increase in the numbers of
reports provided. Two reports account for most increase,
the Selected Acquisition Report (SAR), and the Unit Cost
Report (UCR) . Fifty reports were required in 1980, but
there were over 300 submitted in 1985. The number of pages
in these reports totaled to 600 in 1980; by 1984, the
quantity skyrocketed to more than 1700. There has been a
surge in level of detail and an expansion of format
requirements. [Ref. 23:p. 12] The redundancy of the
transmissions has also been noted. Originally designed as
an internal report for OSD only, the SAR in particular has
come under much criticism as a management tool for Congress
[Ref . 23 :pp. 5-8]
.
The SAR is a comprehensive, summary status report on
major acquisitions that exceed $200 million in yearly
research and development funds, over $1 billion in yearly
procurement, or have significant interest to Congress.
Technical, schedule, and program acquisition cost sections
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are the main divisions of the SAR. The reports show current
program office estimates compared with the planning and
development estimates previously used by senior officials to
approve the transition of the program through the various
phases of acquisition. Reasons for variance must be
explained and demonstrated performance of the weapon system
must be reported in the technical section. SAR's are
prepared quarterly for major systems, annually for lessor
ones. [Ref. 24:p. 6-15]
The UCR is part of the unit cost reporting system
internal to DOD. It shows relationships of unit costs, to
other data provided in the SAR. It also provides management
with a periodic status of unit costs and indications of
possible increases. Congress is notified when certain
conditions trigger the reporting requirement. An immediate
UCR is submitted if there is reason to believe the program
acquisition unit cost will increase by more than 15%; the
Secretary of the Navy must notify Congress in writing within
30 days. At a 2 5% breach of baseline, the Secretary of
Defense must certify that the program is essential to
national security, new unit costs are reasonable, and
management can control further cost escalation. [Ref. 9:p.
77] Failure to do so automatically terminates authority to
obligate funds for the program. This restriction was
inserted in the FY 83 Defense Authorization Act by Senator
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Sam Nunn; the breached program is colloquially known as a
"Nunn Buster" [Ref. 25:p. 3-36].
Although the intent was to improve Congress' ability
to detect cost growth and performance shortfalls in weapons,
the reports' limitations have caused some to criticize their
use. The reports are complex, and may appear to be
inaccurate and inconsistent. The information reported is
not timely. Since content has been rigidly controlled by
legislation, neither OSD or the Navy has been able to modify
the reports to be more understandable. Therefore, because
they record historical information, the reports do not
reflect the actions taken by the service to return an
acquisition program to its baseline assumptions. The
formats are strict, failing to reflect the uncertainty
inherent in applying new technologies. The reports focus on
prior events, thus to an extent limiting their utility to
predict or control the future. [Ref. 23:pp. 5-8]
C. CHARACTERISTICS OF CONGRESSIONAL CONTROL
There are many ways to characterize Congressional
control mechanisms. The awkwardness of the system has
already been mentioned under budget detours. Other process
characteristics include:
1 . Appropr iat ion/Authorization Mismatch
If agreement is required for a budget to become law,
and the starting point of deliberation is the same
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presidential budget, how does Congress appear to speak with
two voices? The Constitution mandates that both chambers of
the legislature concur in the passage of specific
legislation. The outset for authorization and appropriation
in both chambers is the President's budget. But there is no
strict procedural mechanism that matches appropriation to
authorization. This is left to the four committees in the
two houses to coordinate, and to DOD to appeal if the
separate processes yield differing results. Unauthorized
programs do get money, and authorized programs go unfunded.
In FY 85, appropriation committees approved $3 billion for
programs unauthorized, or authorized at a lower level in the
defense substantive legislation [Ref. 26:p. 3]. For FY 86,
the amount was $5.7 billion; in FY 87, $2.7 billion [Ref.
27 :p. 2]. The reasons for these disconnects range from
organizational differences between the Armed Services
Committees and the Appropriations Committees, procedural
variances between the same Committees, haste to meet
deadlines, or outright conflict and rivalry over spending
priorities .
The mismatch confuses DOD about Congress' intention
regarding a program. Either authorization or appropriation
may exist; but both may not be required to legally obligate
funds [Ref. 28:p. 2-38]. Realistically, to proceed with
operations without both legislative mandates risks
antagonizing two Committees of Congress. In cases where a
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committee record supports a conclusion that there was
opposition to a DOD proposal, DOD may initiate a resolution
of the conflict. An agreement is sought from the Committees
whose explicit approval is missing, to sanction the transfer
of funds or to authorize the program. Failure to reach an
understanding usually prevents expenditures for the project.
But an alternative does exist to ignore the disconnect and
proceed in accordance with the last vote of Congress. In
this latter case, appropriation is interpreted as
simultaneous authorization. New programs may be initiated
or previously approved projects may continue operations.
For example, on 4 March 1987, Secretary Weinberger notified
the HASC and SASC that due to the delay in pursuing informal
agreements for appropriated but unauthorized programs, DOD
would begin execution of the FY 87 programs in this category
within 30 days. Subsequently, funds were released in
mid-April 87, without the concurrence of the two Committees.
[Ref. 28:pp. 8-9] .
2 . Delay
Procedural delay is built into the system. When
there is no agreement on budget totals or policy goals,
budget deliberation grinds to a halt. Substance overwhelms
process. Contentious issues such as the Strategic Defense
Initiative, arms control, or anti-satellite weapons prolong
debate over DOD authorizations and appropriations until
agreement within Congress or with the White House is
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reached. Disagreements over deficit reduction matters also
has led to postponement and befuddlement since the passage
of Gramm-Rudman-Hollings [Ref. 3:pp. 250-251], DOD has not
begun its fiscal year with a full budget on time since
FY 77. All thirteen funding bills have not been passed on
time since 1960. One critic views Congress as trying to
accomplish more than is possible; budget, authorizations and
appropriations are squeezed into 9 months. A delay in any
of these, backs up the others as well:
The hegemony of the budget process over the rest of the
legislative agenda occurs in several ways. First, there
just is not sufficient time for Congress to adopt a
budget, authorization bills, and appropriations bills
before the start of a fiscal year. Congress is trying to
fit too many activities into too little time. Any delay
in one step creates a domino effect later in the year.
The budget resolution is taking longer to adopt
(reflecting the lack of consensus in the country on
national priorities). This delays consideration of the
authorization bills, which in turn delays consideration of
appropriations bills and forces Congress to resort to
continuing resolutions for spending measures .. .Congress
fails to meet its deadlines because it has too much to
do.... [Ref. 6:pp. 580-581]
3 . Institutional Conflict
Conflict is always present to some degree between
chambers, between committees, and within subcommittees.
Previously described under Authorization was the gradual
extension of that process to the whole of DOD's budget. One
rationale for this development was a bid for power by the
Armed Services Committees at the expense of Appropriations.
The substantive committees have a traditional bias for
increasing funding [Ref. 3:p. 194]. Therefore, more
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frequent review of substantive legislation translates into
both closer control of defense programs and more
possibilities to lobby Appropriations for higher spending.
But the lobbying may not be the only indication of conflict.
Appropr iators may respond by not funding all authorized
programs. Parliamentary fights then break out in floor
debate because amendments to appropriation bills are first
proposed as vital to national security, then opposed as poor
policy or as budget busters. Wildavsky sums up the
competition as follows: "...the appropriation committees
exemplify the American practice of opposing ambition with
ambition" [Ref. 3:p. 19].
4 . Limited Focus
Congress often appears to focus on the inputs
instead of the outputs of budgeting. Its easier to count
guns, people and dollars than to count units of national
defense. Although the orientation of subcommittees along
mission areas is an attempt to deal with this problem,
analysts view the results at best as mixed. Congress still
has difficulty gaining an overall perspective on an issue.
It tends to view programs in isolation, instead of across
programmatic or service lines. Counting the building blocks
of defense is easier than seeing how they fit together.
[Ref . 8:pp. 227-248] .
Congress prefers to exercise financial and
programmatic oversight at the expense of policy oversight.
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Art defines financial oversight as dealing with the
efficiency of spending money, and programmatic oversight as
questioning the effectiveness of programs [Ref . 8:pp.
227-248]. Policy oversight focuses on the need for
programs. Are specific missions being served or are they
strategically sensible? He has cataloged questions posed by
the committees of Armed Services and Appropriations of both
Houses along the lines of financial, programmatic or policy
subject matter. He shows that policy oversight comes in a
distant third in Congressional priorities. His reasons for
this can be summed up as a lack of political incentives.
Policies do not get congressmen re-elected, but defense
contracts awarded in his district might contribute to this
goal. Coupled with the difficulties in tracking policy
changes through DOD, it is easier for Congress to argue over
where the dollars flow. As Art explains, "The impact of
policy oversight is too general and diffuse, both on a
legislators career advancement and on those objectives he
holds for public policy." [Ref. 8:p. 240].
5 . Duplication and Blurred Role Distinctions
Congress is redundant in budget negotiation and
oversight. The 1974 Budget Act added a third orbit of
deliberation for the budget. Although the phases should be
complementary, the result aggravates conflicts between
Committees. Armed Services annually authorizes programs.
Appropriations increasingly allocates money without regard
38
to authorization. The Budget Committees tread over the same
detailed issues considered settled by the other two
organizations. Thus conclusive action never seems to be
taken. Issues once settled, bubble up again seeking another
compromise. DOD witnesses are burdened with many
preparations and appearances to give testimony.
Distinctions between committees become blurred when
each proceeds on its own agenda. As the roles reverse,
rationales for the two-step process are called in to
question. Are budgets any better if authorizers consider
line item cost estimates at the expense of policy review?
Are policy issues more firmly understood if appropr iators
focus on substantive rather than af fordabil i ty concerns?
When committee's merge their roles, imperfect operational
duplication partly explains the authorization/appropriation
disconnect discussed previously. In other words,
deliberating legislation more than once augments the chances
of arriving at different programs and different funding
levels. But DOD exacerbates the problem. It ignores
committee functional boundaries when it announces its
intention to proceed with programs without authorization,
[Ref. 6:pp. 581-582]
6 . Micromanagement
"Micromanagement" is a term used to describe the
intense, line item by line item scrutiny Congress gives
budgets, and the resulting legislative instructions
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concerning how to spend approved funding. Congress
micromanages the DOD budget in many areas. Former Sen.
Barry Goldwater (R-AZ) scolded the legislators about the
adjustments to over 1900 line items between the two houses
in the FY 87 Authorization Bill [Ref. 29:p. 54]. The SASC
professional staff points to the increase of the Defense
Authorization Bill from nine pages in FY 70 to 165 pages in
FY 85, and the conference report growth from 33 pages to 354
pages in the same period [Ref. 6:p. 591]. Wildavsky cites
the increase in Armed Services hearings from a total of
17, with 1400 pages of testimony in 1960, to 80, with 11,246
pages in 1985 [Ref. 3:p. 386].
Some of the impetus for this development already has
been discussed; i.e., the availability of staff to
thoroughly research issues, personal objectives of Members
seelcing re-election recognition, displays of committee
initiative and aggressiveness in reviewing programs. Other
reasons include real or perceived waste in the executive
branch, skepticism of the ability of government to assure
programmatic outcomes, complex issues requiring solutions
that must be debated democratically, and conscientious
efforts to insure limited resources are utilized effectively
in the interest of national security. [Ref. 9:pp. 60-61]
From DOD' s perspective. Congressional monitoring of
activities is expected to continue. At question is the
severity of oversight. Review results in detailed line item
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changes, second guessing, and outright challenging of DOD
budgetary motives. The result is the constant need for
budget justification on numerous grounds, extensive
reporting requirements, and the frustration of "...someone
else telling us how to fight a war" [Ref. 9:p. 61].
Beyond the effects upon staff interaction in
budgeting. Congressional micromanagement of DOD has
influenced programmatic outcomes. The SASC professional
staff states that Pentagon justifications place too much
emphasis upon resource questions, diverting attention from
strategic planning. Congressional micromanagement flows
down through the bureaucracy as OSD then the services
produce ever- increasing amounts of data on how programs are
functioning, often without addressing long range goals.
Furthermore, the staff says:
The line-item by line-item budgeting embraced by Congress
in recent decades has created perverse incentives in the
defense acquisition system. By budgeting for a specific
weapon, rather than by providing funds to accomplish the
task or mission for which the weapon is intended, the
Services are encouraged to shield marginal programs from
scrutiny. The funded weapon amounts to their only
solution; to lose it is to lose the money for the mission
As a result, the Services tend to fix and patch whatever
problems emerge on that weapon rather than scrap it, try
to sell an alternative approach, and obtain approval for
new funds. [Ref. 6:p. 593]
As trust and consensus is eroded in budgeting, so are the
fundamentals of sound planning.
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7 . The Diffusion of Power
The budget control process has diffused power
throughout Congress. No longer does one committee or even
one influential group of congressmen have final say over the
shape of DOD's budget. Victories in the subcommittee, are
overturned in the full committee, on the floor, or in
conference. The power of the chairman has decreased also,
as noted by several commentators. [Ref. 3:pp. 191-192]
Increasingly, legislators individually seek influence over
DOD's budget. The result is the dissipation of political
energy as the authorization and appropriation legislation is
subjected to more and more floor amendment. For the Senate
alone, amendments to the DOD authorization bill have grown
from 16 in FY 77 to 83 in FY 87 [Ref. 29 :p. 54].
Information is power, too. Those that have it,
including the professional and personal staffs, are in a
position to use it to achieve their aims. There is evidence
that the power of seeking information from, and oversight
of, DOD is something actively sought by individuals and
committees not formally tasked with this function [Ref.
13:pp. 12-13]. For example, the Senate Governmental Affairs
Committee achieved much notoriety with its 1983 "spare parts
Christmas tree." Ornaments on the tree were overpriced
spare parts with prices that DOD paid appended to each. The
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committee then opened hearings on the alleged abuses because
it was convinced that the SASC would not address the issue.
[Ref. 30:p. A2]
D. CHAPTER SUMMARY
This chapter discussed selected Congressional budget
control mechanisms. Because budgeting is a political
process, the rationale for budget control also is political.
Controls are essentially procedural in nature, revolving
around authorization, appropriation and oversight
activities. Control in the authorization and appropriation
processes is similar. Both include hearings and testimony
in committee and subcommittee from executive branch
witnesses, budget bill mark-up, committee reports, floor
debate and initial vote, joint conference votes, final floor
votes and transmission of enacted legislation to the
President. Oversight includes hearings, investigations by
Congress, examination by "watchdog" agencies, and
requirement for submission of reports from CBO, GAO and the
executive branch. Problems with control include the
authorization/appropriation mismatch, delay in passage of
budget legislation, institutional conflict within Congress,
limited focus of budget review, duplication of effort,
micromanagement , and the dissipation of political energy in
the diffusion of Congressional power. Chapter III will
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NAVY RESPONSES TO CONGRESSIONAL CONTROL
Chapter ll described and analyzed selected Congressional
budget control mechanisms. The control process was divided
into two categories: procedural review of budget formulation
and oversight of budget execution. Characteristics of
controls also were discussed. Navy responses to
Congressional controls are analyzed in this chapter.
Responses are analyzed in the context of budget and program
implementation. The acquisition process is outlined,
commencing with a synopsis of the acquisition cycle. Navy
responses are divided into four categories: features of
program design, efforts to communicate program
justification, financial maneuvering, and direct influences
upon deliberations. Finally, a model of program
implementation is developed including criteria for testing
the model in the case of the DON acquisition of the A-6F
aircraft .
A. THE ACQUISITION PROCESS
Acquisition of a weapon system is a complex procedure
with many implementing directives within DOD and its
sub-organizations. The synopsis below is drawn from Chapter





The Relationship to PPBS
The acquisition process and PPBS are closely tied in
structure, decision processes, and documentation.
Integration attempts to insure against a mismatch in time
and level of acquisition plans and funding. The acquisition
process begins when the services conduct threat analysis to
drive planning in the PPBS system. The intent is to relate
the decision to acquire military hardware to the external
threat to the nation's security. This analysis leads to
establishment of operational requirements. Thus, if the
Navy determines that it needs a particular strike aircraft
that can survive the combat environment projected for the
next decade, then the operational requirement is established
to meet this need. Both the threat analysis and the
operational requirement reflect the need to meet the
war-fighting capabilities of potential adversaries.
2 The Structure of the Acquisition Process
Once the military requirement is established, the
acquisition process proceeds through six phases.
- Concept Exploration.
- Demonstration and Validation.
- Full Scale Engineering Development.
- Production and Deployment.
- Operational Support.
- Upgrade, Modification, Replacement.
During the Concept Exploration phase, the service solicits
and evaluates alternative concepts, in cooperation with
industry, in-house Navy laboratories, universities, and
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federally funded research centers. The concept takes the
form of a technical feasibility model which can be subjected
to test and evaluation. The Demonstration and Validation
phase yields designs and advanced developmental models which
test several promising concepts found during the first
phase. Demonstration of systems and technology is
emphasized to ascertain suitability of concepts to meet the
operational requirement. A single concept is usually chosen
out of this phase to proceed to the next step. In many
cases, the prime contractor is chosen also, although some
programs have provided for competition throughout the first
three phases of the acquisition cycle. The goal of the Full
Scale Engineering Development phase is to produce a fully
tested, documented, and production design. Constant
testing, evaluation and redesign are the hallmarks of this
step. Prototypes are built and pilot production may start.
Production and Deployment introduces the hardware to the
fleet. The Initial Operational Capability Date (IOC) is the
certification date that the weapon system is on-line, ready
for use by operational commanders. The final two phases
provide for support throughout the life span of the system
and upgrades to delay obsolescence. Major upgrades to meet
new threats, or to take advantage of new technologies, begin
again with threat analysis and operational requirement
generation. The A-6F, was such a program, a substantial
improvement to the A-6E aircraft.
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3 . Decision Making Mechanisms
Each phase of the acquisition process terminates in
a milestone decision. The purpose is to review program
progress to decide on program continuation. Approval or
denial of the operational requirement is referred to as the
Milestone decision. A favorable milestone decision
represents authority for program inclusion within the
service's POM. For major acquisition programs, the
decision belongs to the Secretary of Defense, who
promulgates the results in an Acquisition Decision
Memorandum (ADM). Advising him is the Defense Acquisition
Board (DAB) , chaired by the Under-Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition (USD(A)). Major members of the DAB include the
Vice Chairman, JCS (Vice Chair), the Secretaries of the
Army, Navy and Air Force, Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Comptroller) and Director of Program Analysis and
Evaluation (see Appendix F) .
The DAB is the primary forum of decision making
within OSD for acquisition programs and policies. Its
duties include promoting coordination and cooperation within
DOD of matters related to acquisition, recommending
procedures to implement policy initiatives, and considering
matters related to the milestone review process. DAB
recommendations to the Secretary of Defense become the ADM's
which start, continue, or terminate acquisition programs.
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B. RESPONSES TO CONGRESSIONAL CONTROL OF THE ACQUISITION
PROCESS
The acquisition process can be understood as a policy
implementation process, wherein the Navy accepts the
legislative mandates of authorization and appropriation and
proceeds to acquire weapons systems. Responses to controls
then are identified with the characteristics of program
implementation. Two categories of response to Congressional
control involve acquisition programs directly: design and
justification. Two other categories, financial maneuvering
and influence of deliberation, do not fit perfectly into the
context of acquisition because they apply to operational
programs as well. Nevertheless, the concept of policy
implementation is useful in describing Navy responses to
Congressional controls.
1 . Responses to Control Manifested in Acquisition
Program Design
Program design refers to the range of concepts
employed by the Navy to structure an acquisition program.
Selection of these concepts is called formulation of an
acquisition strategy. Their purpose is to improve control
over the three variables by which weapons systems
acquisition is judged as success or failure: weapons system
performance, delivery schedule, and cost. Discussed below
are the elements of baselining, streamlining, non-
developmental items, survivability, integrated logistics
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support, the type of contract, and the role of competition.
An acquisition strategy manages these decision variables.
a. Program Baselining
Baselining is a mandatory management concept in
DOD. DOD Instruction 5000.45 elaborates:
Major program baselining is a technique used to enhance
stability and control cost growth of major programs...
A
stable program environment provides the foundation for
effective program management. [Ref. 31:p. 1]
A baseline is defined as an agreement between
the participants in program management that establishes
minimum system performance requirements, provides a
description of the technical characteristics and
configuration, sets a firm schedule of events, and creates a
projected unit cost goal. Primarily, the participants are
the Navy, OSD, and the test and evaluation agency.
Performance requirements are parameters considered critical
to the success of the weapon's mission, expressed in
definite and measurable terms. The schedule of events
includes milestone decisions, the Initial Operational
Capability date, and the first deployment. Unit cost goals
include reasonable contingency amounts. These objectives
are first articulated in the Demonstration and Validation
Phase of the acquisition cycle. Baseline agreements form
part of the documentation reviewed by the DAB in making
recommendations for milestone decisions to SECDEF. Although
DOD has required consideration of streamlining techniques
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since 1980, Congress codified the practice by amending
Chapter 4 of Title 10 U.S. Code in 1986 [Ref. 32:p. 3913].
A baseline breach occurs when a system
performance parameter is not expected to be met, when a
schedule date will be missed by 90 days, or when unit cost
growth exceeds 15% for a system under development (5% for a
system in production). Changes to baseline are permitted
only under unusual circumstances, and then only with the
concurrence of SECDEF. Such circumstances include a change
in the threat, budget instability, test results, or
Congressional action. Breaches of cost estimates requires
submission of a quarterly SAR and unit cost exception report




Acquisition streamlining is a key strategy
concept. It is outlined in DOD Instruction 5000.43:
The purpose is to promote innovative and cost-effective
acquisition requirements and acquisition strategies that
will result in the most efficient utilization of resources
to produce quality weapon systems and products.
Acquisition streamlining is based on the concept that by
applying pertinent contract requirements and allowing
early industry involvement in recommending the most
cost-effective solutions, the Department of Defense can
reduce the cost and/or time of system acquisition and life
cycle cost without degrading system effectiveness. [Ref.
33:p. 1]
Acquisition streamlining techniques invoke
contract prescriptions that are relevant and cost-effective
for the particular acquisition. These requirements include
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specified performance requirements, contract requirements in
the statement of work, specifications for materials,
contract data requirements, and contract terms and
conditions. Tailoring is the process of evaluating and
modifying the individual requirements to determine their
pertinence to the objective of reducing cost and time.
Streamlining tools include requirements discipline,
specification tailoring, computer-assisted document
preparation, source selection techniques, contracting to
reduce technological risk and cost exposure, or streamlining
clauses in contracts. The importance of industry's close




The Navy is committed to a policy to
institutionalize Non-Developmental Item (NDI) considerations
during all phases of the acquisition process [Ref. 34:p. 1].
NDI are items of supply meeting one of the following
cr i ter ia
:
- available in the commercial marketplace.
- previously developed by an agency of the U. S.
Government or that of an ally.
- an item meeting the conditions of 1 or 2 above, but
requiring only slight modification for the requirements
of the procuring agency.
- any item currently being produced although not
commercially for sale, or not yet in use,
[Ref. 32:p. 3917]
Such "off-the shelf" type items do not require
the lengthy development cycle to prove their technological
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application. Therefore, time is shortened for fielding a
weapons system, money is saved as a result of the shortened
time span and reduced development costs, and state-of-the-
art technology is used to satisfy user need [Ref. 35:p. 7].
The Navy's goal is to make NDI considerations the rule
rather than the exception in acquisition [Ref. 25:p. 3-52].
Program managers are expected to aggressively pursue
procurement of "off-the-shelf" type items and integrate them
into the acquisition of weapons systems.
Congress concurred in this assessment of NDI,
and incorporated the policy into Section 2325 of the FY 87
Authorization Act [Ref. 32:pp. 3917-3918]. Furthermore,
Congress required both OSD and GAO to report on DOD efforts
to implement NDI policies, describe the effectiveness of




Survivability is the capability of a weapon
system to carry out its designated mission in a combat
environment [Ref. 25:p. 4-72]. It is the combination of
factors that determine the probability of a hit from enemy
fire and the ability to carry out the mission after
sustaining damage. DOD Instruction 5000.2 requires the
consideration of survivability in all phases of the
acquisition cycle [Ref. 36:encl. (4):p. 4-1]. An analysis
will include the criteria for combat effectiveness, the
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effects of enemy weapons, susceptibility to electronic
measures, and the protection of personnel operating the
system.
DOD recognizes that Congress and the public have
been increasingly critical of the development of expensive
weapon systems that are vulnerable to "cheap kills" or to
specific threats [Ref. 25:p. 4-72], In addition to the
requirement to document survivability analysis, the services
must include an explicit threat statement in any
justification for a major system new start, submit analysis
in the milestone review packages, and incorporate
survivability factors in the testing program. Survivability
against the full spectrum of warfare threats has been
emphasized, including both nuclear and non-nuclear combat
scenarios. Furthermore, each system must be periodically
re-evaluated during its operational phase for upgrade or
modification in light of new survivability concerns,
e. Integrated Logistics Support
As explained under baselining, establishing the
performance characteristics of a weapon system is a major
consideration from the outset of the acquisition process
because of the relationship with the two other decision
variables, cost and schedule. Program managers are reminded
that approximately 70% of a system's life cycle costs are
fixed in the Concept Exploration phase because of the chosen
concepts and performance thresholds [Ref. 25:p. 1-8]. The
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choice of the desired characteristics also affects the Test
and Evaluation Master Plan (TEMP) , the document that
specifies where, when and how testing will be conducted.
The results of testing will form the criteria for deciding
the commitment of further resources or to advance a program
from one acquisition phase to another. The TEMP is drafted
as early as possible in the acquisition process to reduce
acquisition risks and estimate the capability of the system
to meet all technical and operational requirements [Ref
.
37:p. 2] .
Among the factors to be tested are objectives of
logistics support. Even though logistics support
requirements may not have been a part of the basis for
determining the initial operational requirement for a weapon
system, they are elevated to the same importance of
consideration [Ref. 38:p. 2]. Logistic support measures
result in attainment of desired readiness and support
objectives, i.e., the weapon system's ability to deliver the
output for which it was designed within constraints upon
operational funding, manpower, test and diagnostic
equipment, and spare parts availability [Ref. 39:p. 3-1].
The tool to achieve the objectives is systems engineering.
Systems engineering is defined as:
...the application of scientific and engineering efforts
to: (1) transform an operational need into a description
of a system configuration which best satisfies the
operational need according to the measures of
effectiveness; (2) integrate related technical parameters
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and assure compatibility of all physical, functional, and
technical program interfaces in a manner which optimizes
the total system definition and design; and (3) integrate
the efforts of all engineering disciplines and specialties
into the total engineering effort, [Ref. 39:pp. 4-1-4-2]
The general topic of logistics support includes
many specific areas. Reliability and maintainability are
examined in more detail because of their use in the A-6F
acquisition case.
(1) Reliabil i ty . Reliability is "the duration
or probability of failure-free performance under stated
conditions" [Ref. 40:encl. (l):p. 1]. One of its specific
measures of performance is mean-time-between-f ailure . For
an aircraft, this is measured as the average time between
component failures and is not limited to events that result
in designating the aircraft unable to fly.
(2) Maintainability . Maintainability is:
...the ability of an item to be . . . rest ored to specified
condition when maintenance is performed by personnel
having specified skill levels, using prescribed procedures
and resources, at each prescribed level of maintenance and
repair. [Ref. 40:encl, (l):p. 1]
Its most common measure is Mean-Time-To-Repair , the average
time to restore the aircraft to 100% capability.
Maintainability concerns go beyond the time factors that
affect diagnosis, removal and installation of the failed
part. Included also are the costs of manpower, training,
and maintenance of facilities to repair aircraft and
components.
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f. Types of Contracts
The contract establishes the relationship
between the government and industry. it defines objectives,
responsibilities, and authority of each party, as well as
provides flexibility for modification [Ref. 25:p. 4-23].
There are two general types of contracts: fixed-price and
cost- reimbursement. The major distinction is in industry's
obligation and risk. Fixed-price contracts place the
greatest obligation and the most risk upon industry to
deliver a product at an agreed price. Cost-reimbursement
type contracts places the obligation upon the government to
reimburse or share costs, in some cases regardless if any
product is ever delivered. It is DOD policy that the
appropriate type of contract be employed consistent with the
facts and circumstances involved [Ref. 41:p. 16.1-2],
Factors to consider before deciding on the type of contract
to pursue include the changing requirements of the contract,
the nature of the technology, the government resources
committed to monitor and control the contractor, and the
predicted accuracy of the government's cost estimates.
There are several sub-types of fixed-price
contracts, distinguished by their incorporation of the
profit incentive for the contractor. For example, the firm
fixed-price sub-type (FFP) establishes the greatest profit
incentive to control costs and deliver the product at the
agreed time. Failure to comply could result in a
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determination of default and subject the contractor to
financial penalties. [Ref. 25:p. 4-23]
Increasingly, the Navy employs FFP contracts in
the Concept Exploration and Demonstration and Validation
phases of the acquisition cycle. FFP contracts streamline
the process because they are easier to award and administer
than any other contract type; negotiation is kept to a
minimum and the cost of monitoring performance is low. FFP
contracts also enhance competitiveness within industry
because contractors themselves determine the products they
deliver [Ref. 25:p. 4-24]. The competitive factors include
both cost and quality of the delivered product. But this
development is not without its critics. Industry complains
that they are forced to assume a disproportionate share of
the technological risk and the cost responsibility:
...the superior bargaining position of the government
enables contracting officers to limit the government's
cost exposure and to push as much of the risk on the
contractor without regard for the goal of a contract that
is fair and reasonable to both parties. [Ref. 42:p. 47]
Furthermore, GAO has notes that the use of FFP contracts may
not be warranted when both the government's cost estimates
are unreliable and the quantity of the product to be
delivered is not established [Ref. 43:pp. 63-64]. The end
result is increased cost when the Navy is required to "bail
out" the contractor in order to receive the desired product.
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g. Competition in the Acquisition Process
The drive for more competition in defense
systems acquisition comes from several sources. OSD has
been committed to competitive procurement since promulgation
in 1981 of the Acquisition Improvement Program under the
auspices of then Deputy Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucci:
The value of competition in the acquisition process is one
of our most widely accepted concepts. We believe that it
reduces the costs of needed supplies and services,
improves contractor performance, helps to combat rising
costs, increases the industrial base, and ensures fairness
of opportunity for award of government contracts. [Ref.
44:p. 10]
DOD Instruction 5000.2 now requires the program manager to
address a plan for competition in all phases of the
acquisition cycle [Ref. 36:pp. 7, 9-10]. Certification of
the plan is under the purview of the Competition Advocate
General for the appropriate service. Competition Advocates
have been appointed at most buying activities to review
contracts for conformity to competitive procedures and to
foster competition at every level of procurement.
Congress augmented DOD ' s efforts when it enacted
the Competition in Contracting Act of 1984 (PL 98-369). The
act requires the use of competitive procedures in order to
obtain full and open competition, eliminates preference for
formal advertising which puts competitive proposals on a par
with sealed bids, eliminates the exceptions justifying
negotiations, and limits the use of non-competitive
procedures [Ref. 45:pp. 1175-1203]. Finally, as noted
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under types of contracts, the Navy has increasingly turned
to FFP type contracts because of the cost and quality
advantages derived from competition.
The embrace of competition has almost drowned
out any warnings concerning its appropriateness. The search
for a "second-source" for weapons previously procured on a
sole-source basis is an area of competitive procurement that
has been analyzed [Ref, 44:pp. 10-21, 35]. Although the
threat of seeking a second source of supply can keep costs
of sole-source supplies from escalating, 14 interlocking
conditions have been found for which second-sourcing is not
indi cated
.
- Small procurement quantities or erratic yearly lot
sizes
- Short duration of production.
- Shallow slope of the learning curve (i.e., as cumulative
production doubles, a comparatively slow rate of
decrease in costs)
.
- Relative complexity of the weapon system.
- Employment of immature or "leading edge" technologies.
- Strong potential for other Government or commercial
applications
.
- Research and development funding primarily developed
from private sources.
- Large cost of unique tooling/facilities.
- Large cost of transferring Unique Government owned
tool ing/equ ipment from the original contractor to the
second source.
- Large unused capacity by the original contractor.
- Lack of commonality of production line output affecting
the maintenance concepts of the weapon system,
- Long production lead times.
- Significant involvement of subcontractors with the
original prime contractor.
- Large degree of contractual complexity.
[Ref. 44:pp. 19-21 ]
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A case study of the AIM-7F Sparrow Air-to-Air Missile
illustrates the pitfalls of encouraging too much competition
through second-sourcing [Ref. 46:pp. 28-35],
h. Summary of Responses to Control in Acquisition
Program Design
The above acquisition regulations and strategies
clearly have themes in common: the driving force to hold
down costs, improve schedules, and prevent "gold-plated"
performance of weapon systems (exceeding reasonable levels
of a weapon system's measures of effectiveness, building in
more capability than necessary). Cost, schedule and
performance are the variables by which acquisition programs
will be judged as successes or failures within DOD
.
Alternatively, program instability, increasing cost,
decreasing performance, and delay are the classic symptoms
of program dysfunction. Therefore, a prime goal is to
identify the factors in the acquisition process which affect
the variables and bring them under the control of the
program manager and other policy implemen ters
.
The Navy uses various acquisition strategies to
market programs to Congress. For example, because Congress
has expressed its preference for NDI , it is reasonable to
expect Navy witnesses to proclaim NDI (and its adjunct
strategy, commonality between weapons systems) as major Navy
efforts to address Congressional concerns over costs and
performance. Furthermore, by indicating that costs.
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schedule, and performance are under control, the Navy is
laying the foundation for political support that translates
into program survival and funding through the
author ization/appropr iation process.
Moreover, detailed plans imply the readiness to
commit funds quickly to accomplish programmatic objectives.
To the extent that this quality is real, orderly and rapid
obligation is a guarantee that Congress will not later
change its mind and try to recapture the funds. The threat
of recapture is not imaginary. Since FY 85, Congress has
required both DOD and GAO to annually report on unexpended
balances in all appropriation accounts. The impetus for
reports was disbelief of DOD budget projections, and
distrust of DOD intentions to effectively obligate or return
funds to the Treasury [Ref. 47:pp. S6787-S6791]
.
2 . Program Justif ication--Educat ing Congress
a. Military Inexperience
From the Navy's viewpoint. Congress needs
continuous re-education about DON missions, hardware
capabilities, decision processes, organization, and role in
national defense. One reason, as commentators have long
noticed, may be the ever decreasing numbers of Senators,
Representatives and staff with military experience [Ref.
48:p. 37-48]. Many Navy program managers agree with that
assessment. [Ref. 49:p. 19]. OSD advises prospective
witnesses not to assume that budget briefing material
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provided by DOD will be read prior to a hearing, and
therefore not to over estimate the knowledge of the Members
[Ref . 49:p. 5]
.
b. Keep It Simple
Most DOD guides for delivering Congressional
testimony impress upon witnesses the "KIS" principle (Keep
It Simple) when discussing the performance characteristics
of their weaponry. One guide for military officers
briefing Congress advises that program descriptions should
be framed along the lines of baking a single chocolate chip
cookie. Elements of the story include discovery of
grandmother's recipe, a trip to the supermarket to buy the
ingredients, and baking a batch. Costs are analyzed as
those related to the ingredients: electricity for the oven,
gas for the car, the baker's salary, and incidental
expenses. [Ref. 50:p. 5]. Alternatively, OSD suggests that
expert backup witnesses be carefully instructed and
rehearsed in the type and character of testimony to be
provided [Ref. 49:p. 4].
An example of how to keep an issue simple in the
minds of congressional decision makers is provided by a
helicopter program manager. When he visits a Member, he
likes to leave a small model of his aircraft in the office
anteroom. He has found that subsequent visitors, waiting
for their appointments, like to play with the model by
spinning the blades and moving the wheels. The Member is
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then reminded that people waiting to see him are aware of
his support for U.S. Marine Corps. [Ref. 51]
c. The Lack of Military Wisdom
Several researchers have found that flag
officers resent Congressional direction because Members lack
military expertise. Both staff and Members are viewed as
"gifted amateurs"; their positions on military issues are
not credible because the decision makers are largely
self-taught [Ref. 52:pp. 29-42]. After interviewing top
officials in the services about their perceptions of the
Congressional Military Reform Caucus, two researchers
concluded that much opposition centered around alleged
charges of a lack of military knowledge and wisdom among the
members of Congress [Ref. 13:pp. 1-2].
d. Summary of Strategies to Educate Congress
What is the significance of simple explanations
and justifications of programs? Do simplistic parables lead
Congress to increased understanding, or increased
willingness to change DOD policy proposals? Are
professional disagreements about complex issues such as
force composition and tactics founded on perceptions of
incompetence in military affairs? It is difficult to answer
these questions with certainty. Nevertheless, DOD wants to
express program rationale in language understandable to
Congress, and explaining the rationale may employ tricks of
storytelling. Promotional efforts serve the purpose of
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winning general program acceptance and approval; and, in
terms of authorization and appropriation, support may result





There are two sub-categories under this heading:
financial tactics that gain more funding for a specific
program, and tactics that gain general sympathy for the
vicissitudes of budget execution.
a. Tactics to Gain Funding
(1) Advanced and Multi-year Procurement . DOD
Instruction 7200.4 establishes the policy to fully fund
procurements in annual appropriation acts [Ref. 53:p. 1].
The objective is to provide funds at the outset for the
total estimated cost of a program so that Congress and the
public are fully aware of its financial dimensions. Most
weapons systems are procured in yearly increments, with
contracts based on the quantities authorized and
appropriated for the particular year. Quantities vary
because of tradeoffs in DOD's proposals, and because of
politically dictated outcomes of the Congressional budget
process. Advance procurement for long lead time items and
economic order quantity procurement (multi-year procurement)
may provide exceptions to this policy.
The typical budget justification for advance
procurement is used to obtain budgets for weapon system
components, parts and materials whose lead times are
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significantly longer than normal and for procurements that
must be funded in an advanced timeframe to maintain a
planned production schedule. Multi-year procurement expands
advance procurement through multi-year contracts to purchase
more than one fiscal year's program increment of components,
materials and parts. The objective is to obtain the
economic advantages of large order quantities. Multi-year
procurement commits both Congress and DOD to buying specific
quantities of weapons over a number of years, and in some
instances to incur high penalty costs for contract
cancellation. In theory, the strategy takes advantage of
longer production runs, greater stability in numbers
produced, and efficiencies of long-range planning and
investment by industry [Ref. 53: end. (2):p. 2-1]. Among
the factors considered before employing this budget approach
are cost avoidance, the stability of design and funding, and
the confidence in price estimates and contractor
capabilities. [Ref. 54:pp. 5-39-5-43] Advanced and
multi-year strategies often are built into overall
acquisition plans of large weapon systems, for example the
M-1 Abrams Tank, the B-IB strategic bomber, the Trident
class submarine, and the Nimitz class aircraft carrier.
[Ref. 54:p. 5-43]
(2) Reprogramming . Reprogramming refers to:
...changes in application of financial resources from the
purpose originally contemplated and budgeted for,
testified to, and described in the justifications
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submitted to the congressional committees in support of
fund authorizations and budget requests. [Ref. 55:p. 2]
DOD policy statements indicate that at times Congress
understands where rigid adherence to the justified amounts
in budget enactments may unduly jeopardize the effective
accomplishment of programs in a businesslike and economical
manner [Ref. 56:p. 1]. Unforeseen technical requirements,
changes in operating conditions, revision of price estimates
and wage rate adjustments all require flexibility to adapt.
Reprogramming may save time if the
administrative permission to act occurs within DOD; actions
not involving change from the purposes justified in budget
presentations may be approved by the service secretaries,
thus accelerating modifications to the FYDP. Nevertheless,
reprogramming procedures enable Congressional retention of
control over budget execution. Prior Committee approval is
required for funding of increases in quantities of
designated major weapons systems or for minor systems known
to be of Congressional interest [Ref. 55:p. 2].
Notification is required for transfers exceeding thresholds,
such as $5 million in a procurement account or $2 million in
a RDT&E account. The increasing Congressional review and
approval of budget detail in line item format has multiplied
the number of reprogramming requests generated. The
President's budget each year routinely includes
reprogramming requests. [Ref. 57:p. 60].
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(3) Supplemental Appropriation . Supplemental
appropriations are another means of getting funds from
Congress. Returning to Congress mid-year to ask for more
money is politically risky because it may carry the stigma
that the service does not know how to manage the money that
was already given. On the other hand. Congress can often be
persuaded to vote more funds if the circumstances justifying
the request are beyond the control of a prudent manager.
The Navy more than once has returned for additional money
for fuel for ships and aircraft when contingency operations
in response to a crisis have gone over conservative budget
projections
.
(4) Pork Barrel . Members of Congress sometimes
employ criteria in budgeting decisions to reward their local
districts. This is a logical outcome of the electoral
process. Classical treatment of "pork barrel" legislation
begins with a discussion of pressures brought to bear by
various interest groups, and proceeds through explanation of
the service to the public interest [Ref. 7:pp. 88-91]. The
legislative strategy of tailoring program proposals to meet
the needs of a particular clientele, described by Wildavsky
[Ref, 3:p. 101], connects with Members' desires for
re-election. Thus, "pork barrel" budgeting is tied
inevitably to policy formulation and implementation.
Several factors outlined in Chapter II under
characteristics of Congressional controls, show the effects
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of pork barrel politics on policy design. Increased
influence of staff enables Congress to review proposals in
specifics. Amassing of budget detail provides the means for
the type of micromanagement that shifts programs to serve
local interests. This, coupled with opportunities from a
redundant budget review process, results in policies that
are often narrowly focused. Because legislative majorities
are needed to assure funding over a period of years.
Executive agencies arrive at strategies that spread the
benefits of spending. The Executive takes advantage of
institutional behavior of Congress to insure enactment of
programs
.
Program approval is expedited when it offers
something for everyone. A naval officer in OLA calls the
legislative arena the "wampum society, the key to a
Congressman's vote" [Ref. 14]. John Lehman was accused of
"pork barrelling" when he lobbied for the strategic
homeporting program. Senator Goldwater facetiously said
that after Lehman's testimony, he would love to see a Navy
homeport in Arizona! [Ref. 58:p. S10583]. Spending in home
districts also creates pressures when DOD tries to cut back.
In 1985, Senator Gary Hart (D-CO) joined with Dr. Lawrence
Korb, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower,
installations and Logistics, in lamenting the legal and
administrative hurdles Congress imposes on base closures
[Ref. 59:p. 25]. A Navy legislative liaison summed up the
69
situation when he said, "Much of what passes for
Congressional micromanagement is pure pork" [Ref. 14],
b. Circumstances That Gain Congressional Empathy
The second sub-category of financial
manipulation is a tactic that gains understanding for the
mutability of budget execution. This is the case where
heroic attempts to remain in budget are made, but the
situation can not be retrieved. Most often this occurs in
the operational accounts when international crises force the
service to spend money that was not budgeted. Twice in the
1980 's, the Navy has been in budgetary extremis caused by
events in the Persian Gulf. In FY 80, the Navy took a
number of steps, including delaying ship overhauls, to
retain obligational authority in the O&MN account to fund
Iranian contingency operations. The routine appropriation
lapse into the "M" account was postponed for two years to
ascertain final expenditures before seeking a special
appropriation to match budget authority with outlays. In
FY 87, the Navy indicated to Congress that it would absorb
the additional costs of Persian Gulf operations (fuel, spare
parts, travel for minesweeper crews, hostile fire pay, to
name only a few) . To make up the difference, there has been
much juggling of the books. According to RADM Seely, Deputy
Comptroller of the Navy, reduced budgets in the shore
establishment has paid for many of these items. He says one
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other outcome was a sympathetic hearing in Congress when the
O&MN accounts for FY 89 were briefed. [Ref. 60]
c. Summary of Financial Manipulations
What is the significance of financial
manipulations of the budget? The tactics of reprogramming
,
multi-year and advance procurement, and supplemental
appropriations requests are bids by the Navy for program
stability in accordance with its implementation objectives.
They assure the level of funding is in agreement with the
service's POM, and delivery of weapons is in accordance with
the FYDP. Reprogramming and supplemental appropriation may
also fall into the realm of "damage control," i.e.,
attempting to restore programs to funding levels previously
cut back by Congress. Alternatively, both tactics may be
employed as a means to seek clarification about
Congressional intent when an appropriation-authorization
disconnect exists.
The tactics of taking advantage of pork barrel
spending and uncertainty in budget execution have more
generalized goals related to program survival. To the
extent that programs develop a momentum driven by special
interest groups from the defense industry, organized labor,
or local communities seeking job and revenue spinoffs,
legislators find it unpalatable to risk defeat in the next
election because they voted against funding a DOD program
that promised to meet special interest goals. The immediate
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objective is to spread Government largess as widely as
possible, to prevent substantial Congressional opposition
from developing by exploiting the implied risk of defeat at
the polls. Similarly, the bid for empathy in coping with
uncertainty creates an atmosphere of friendliness, trust and
benevolence in which programs stand to gain more political
support against termination, if not more funding.
Lastly, as discussed under program design,
reprogramming and supplemental appropriation have a latent
quality that the intended uses of the funds are well planned
and that they can be obligated in an orderly manner. This
DOD guarantee of its capability to spend money quickly and
efficiently duels with Congress' momentary desire to see
funds spent wisely or not at all. But the DOD objective is
for long term program survival.
4 . Responses that Seek to Influence Congressional
Budget Deliberations
The Navy regulates contacts of its personnel with
Congress. The Navy's Office of Legislative Affairs (OLA)
and the Comptroller of the Navy (NAVCOMPT) are buffers
between the service and the legislature for passing
information in both directions. There are informal means to
educate prospective witnesses about the pitfalls of
Congressional testimony. The Navy also encourages flag
officer contact with individual Congressional Members and
staff. Each of these features is expanded below.
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a. The Role of NAVCOMPT and OLA
The Navy splits responsibilities for legislative
liaison between two offices [Ref. 61:p. 1]. NAVCOMPT
coordinates relations with the Appropriations Committees of
Congress. The Navy empowers OLA as the focus for
Congressional relations and legislative liaison for all
other committees. Both transmit to Congress reports,
written responses to inquiries, and answers to questions
submitted for the hearing record. OLA also has the
following duties:
- Develop, coordinate and process Navy actions relating to
proposed legislation. Executive Orders and Presidential
Proclamations
.
- Develop, coordinate and process Navy actions relating to
Congressional investigations and other matters affecting
relations with Congress.
- Provide Members with information concerning plans and
programs which affect their respective states, districts
and committee business.
- Supervise, coordinate and make arrangement for the
presentation of statements, testimony, briefings and
reports to Members and committees of Congress by
military and civilian personnel.
- Monitor and evaluate Congressional proceedings and
actions affecting the Navy. Disseminate pertinent
information to DOD officials.
- Coordinate the release of classified information to
Congress
.
- Supervise travel arrangements for Members when
designated a responsibility of the Navy.
- Maintain continuous liaison with Congress, OSD and other
governmental agencies in connection with the above
duties .
[Ref. 62:pp. 2-3]
The naval officers assigned to the Congressional Liaison
Offices of OLA, physically located on Capitol Hill, are the
personnel who come into daily contact with Members of the
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Armed Services Committees and personal and professional
staff. Both offices brief prospective witnesses in hearings
and investigations about current topics of interest to
Congress. The flow of information is not in one direction;
both offices relay inquiries from Members and staff to the
appropriate organizations within the service. Navy policy
is that "Navy components will make maximum information
available promptly to the Members of Congress and
congressional committees and their staffs...." [Ref . 61:p.
2] Complete or interim replies to inquiries must be
forwarded in five working days.
b. The Pitfalls of Congressional Testimony
Although preparation for testimony can be
extensive, education about Congressional processes and
procedures can be informal and fragmented. For example,
there is no official DOD handbook on how to testify before
Congress. But, Congressional Involvement and Relations. A
Guide for Department of Defense Program Managers is a
resource publication of the Defense System Management
College which "gives the guy who has just come from years of
operating in the field, wearing flight gear or pushing
troops, . . . something of substance he can use right away"
[Ref. 9:p. 5]. The advice in the "Lessons Learned" segment
is empirical, based on the experiences of witnesses and
interviews with Members and staff of Congress (see Appendix
G) .
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Two aspects of the control of information is the
need for consistency in what is presented to Congress, and
the need to support the current "official" position.
Regarding the former, the military places great value on
being accurate and consistent in its testimony. As the
Congressional Involvement and Relations guide explains, "A
pitfall to avoid: Congress hearing different things on the
same subject from OSD , the services, and the contractors"
[Ref. 9:p. 7]. Other researchers have found that DOD's own
informal guidance, passed by word of mouth, is that prior
preparation, taking backup experts along, knowing what is of
immediate concern to committees, and knowing the political
implications of testimony, are all important considerations
before testifying [Ref. 49:pp. 4-6]. SECNAVINST 5730. IIB
is more explicit: "There should be common preparation for
appearances before the Armed Services and Appropriations
Comm i t tees ... The development of presentations as a unified
and purposeful package is of paramount importance...."
[Ref. 63:p. 3]
Support of the official position is considered
to be of prime importance:
It is expected that witnesses will carefully avoid
volunteering views differing from the budget, either on or
off the record. While direct questions at hearings must
be answered frankly, a witness who feels that he must set
forth a personal view inconsistent with the President's
budget will also point out that the President's judgement
on the matter was reached from his overall perspective as
the head of the Government and in the light of overriding
national policy. The witness should make clear that his
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personal comments are not to be construed as a request for
additional funds. [Ref. 24:p, 4-9]
As noted previously, OLA also prepares Navy
witnesses to appear before Congress. The nature of the
preparation can be philosophical. A Navy Congressional
liaison officer says that the Navy has an obligation to
answer questions truthfully and thoroughly as part of
building a contractual relationship with Congress [Ref. 14].
If Congress asks the right type of question (indicating some
understanding of acquisition procedures and the tactics for
weapons employment, or the rationale for the use of military
force, etc.) then the Navy has the responsibility.
Otherwise, simplistic questions (grandstanding, seeking
media exposure, muckraking) deserve simplistic answers,
c. Encouraging Personal Contact
Urging high level contact with Congressional
Members and staff is a strategy that builds an image of
openness and an atmosphere of friendliness. Through OLA,
the Navy operates a program called Project Outreach. Flag
officers from outside Washington are encouraged to seek a
visit to the office of the Representative or Senator from
the district where their command is located. The genesis of
Project Outreach in mid-1987 may have been the perceived
dislike of the Chief of Naval Operations (ADM Carlisle
Trost) , and then Secretary of the Navy (James Webb) to keep
close contact with Congress as the previous occupants of
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their offices (ADM James Watkins and John Lehman,
respectively). Before the visit, the flag officer is
briefed about any specific concerns or interests the Member
may have; afterwards the admiral is debriefed. The same OLA
liaison explains that he sees the program as a means of
"putting the 'consumer' in touch with the decision makers."
[Ref . 14] .
5 . Summary of Responses to Acquisition Process Control
Responses to controls have been presented in four
categories: program design, justification, financial
manipulation and influence over deliberations. Examples of
program design strategies include baselining, streamlining,
NDI , survivability, integrated logistics support, contract
types and competition. Program justification is the efforts
invested to educate Congress about Navy missions, hardware
capabilities and procedures in light of perceptions of
inexperience and lack of expertise. Examples of financial
manipulations are advance and multi-year procurement,
reprogramming , supplemental appropriations, taking advantage
of "pork barrel spending" and circumstances that illustrate
the mutability of budget execution. Finally, the Navy
regulates the contacts its personnel have with Members and
staff by focusing liaison through OLA, educating prospective
witnesses about Congressional procedure, and encouraging
informal flag officer briefings.
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C. A MODEL OF PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION
The purpose of using a model of program implementation
to analyze the A-6F acquisition is to provide insight into
the budgetary and oversight relationships and functions of
political institutions. A model provides a framework for
understanding the actions and motivations of institutions
and political actors as they carry out their roles in
budgeting. The complexities of budgeting may be simplified
and analyzed more carefully through comparison to the model,
which leads to discernment of the forces that shape
programmatic outcomes.
1 . Bardach' s Model
An implementation model developed by Bardach defines
the process of program implementation as one of the
logistical assembling of various actions and players to
produce desired programmatic outputs. Semi-autonomous
institutions or groups become contributors of inputs to
program implementation. The process is political in that it
is characterized by bargaining and persuasion. Institutions
involved include both governmental and private, formal and
informal. They are either solicitors or providers of
resources. Their motivation to participate is related to
their desire to influence and benefit from outcomes.
Bargaining and persuasion take the form of "game-playing"
whereby performance and action are delivered or withheld
from the strategy assembly process based on the perceived
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and desired results of the game. Because a programmatic
outcome is designed during policy formulation and is assumed
by participants to be achievable, the terms of cooperation
and resource sharing are at issue in the bargaining process.
In Bardach's view, organizations contribute or withhold
strategic participation to gain or avoid blame,
responsibility or scrutiny, and are often defensive in
motivation. [Ref. 2:pp. 36-37]
2 . An Extrapolated Model
An application of Bardach's model begins by
identifying the purposes of DON strategies. Strategies are
tailored to fit the structure of weapon acquisition programs
and the procedures for their enactment by Congress.
Moreover, in the highly charged political atmosphere of OSD
and Congressional decision making, programs must appeal to
the political objectives of the decision makers to remain in
the budget. Thus another purpose for implementation
strategies is to acquire elements of support needed for
programmatic survival.
a. Program Implementation: A Gathering of
Components
Program implementation is a process of
assembling the correct components related to increasing
political feasibility. The procedure is analogous to the
construction of a policy "machine" that manufactures program
outcomes. The original legislative mandate is a blueprint.
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Legislative approval and funding are parts of the schematic.
The machine may be assembled from scratch or built from
parts of another program. Congressional control is the key
feature that influences the gathering and assembly of
components
.
What are the actions that the Navy seeks?
First, the Navy needs authorization and appropriation for
its budget from Congress, because without these, programs do
not exist. Other components are intelligence assessments
and analysis from the intelligence community in order to
formulate operational requirements, war-fighting strategy
and tactics developed under the JCS to integrate the weapon
into national defense policy, and assistance and services
from industry because they provide the manpower and
production facilities to turn weapon blueprints into
hardware. Furthermore, the Navy requests facilities and
assistance from the other services, and cost/benefit
analyses and technical services from OSD . Above all, the
Navy needs political support, the type of support that
provides stability in program direction and funding,
b. Stability
Stability is a key component because it impacts
heavily upon the variables of cost, performance and
scheduling. The variables interlock so that adjustment to
one affects the others. For example, if concern for program
af f ordabi 1 i ty forces an adjustment to product delivery
80
(i.e., buying smaller quantities), the result can be
increasing unit costs above the established baseline.
Similarly, if operational testing reveals weapon system
performance weaknesses, a decision to seek further
refinement of the technology delays the introduction of the
weapon to the fleet and usually increases cost. The Navy
constructs some acquisition programs to enhance stability of
performance by minimizing technological risk, for example
including non-developmental items and commonality in
acquisition strategies.
But stability in political support and funding
is made all the more difficult by the necessity of relating
policy formulation to implementation. Policy implementation
is not cleanly separated from policy formulation. The sharp
dividing line is not present as Congress requires annual
review of previously approved authorizations and
appropriations. Most programs are revisited every year in
briefings and testimony to legislators and staff. Few
decisions to proceed with program development are final.




What are the Navy's programmatic goals? In
addition to a weapon system that meets baseline cost,
performance and scheduling criteria, program survival is
paramount. Programs are the building blocks of the POM
81
process. They represent the details of force structure to
be employed in the nation's defense. Programs that are
cancelled in development require substitution in the war-
fighting strategy. Reformulation of the strategy itself
also may be needed. Furthermore, program survival is an
indication of political success, which enhances service
autonomy and independence from OSD.
d. Autonomy
The components of approval and support rest in
the hands of many different parties, all of whom are
somewhat independent. The autonomy and separation of powers
between the legislative and the executive branches is rooted
in the Constitution. But the independence of the services
from OSD, JCS, or the presidential administration is
heightened by the POM process where individual programs are
proposed and approved by the services, and then reviewed by
OSD. As noted by Hobkirk, "...the pluralism of the American
political process requires the independent voice of each
Service be part of the debate" [Ref. 64:p. 107]. Further
evidence of autonomy is provided by the Carlucci acquisition
program administration initiatives of 1981. The initiatives
decentralized decision making to the service acquisition
executives and empowered them with responsibility and
accountability for program administration. [Ref. 65:pp.
341-351]
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The autonomy of the services is an important
feature of the program implementation strategy assembly
process. The Navy asserts independence by establishing its
ownership of a program. The service then solicits political
support from other organizations. The Navy also assumes the
leading role to defend its programs. Ownership, in turn,
typically produces a strategy that is offensive in nature.
The Navy pursues successful achievement of program
objectives. The support organizations solicited by the Navy
are influenced by defensive and control considerations to
participate in policy implementation, avoiding scrutiny,
blame or responsibility if a program develops symptoms of
dysf unct ion
.
e. Avoidance of Implementation Problems
Within the context of achieving national defense
objectives, the Navy acts to prevent project delay,
excessive cost, and underperf ormance.
(1) Project Delay . Delay lengthens an
acquisition process that is measured in years from
conception to fruition. Planners manipulate the complexity
of acquisition plans to shorten schedules. For example, the
A-6 took 6 years to go from initial design competition to
fleet introduction (1957-1963). The A-6E variant took only
3 years (Aug 69-Nov 72) . A new wing for the aircraft, made
from composite materials, will take about 2 years for
delivery. [Ref. 66:pp. 427-428] Delay from the political
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\process only exacerbates the long timetables already
present
.
(2) Cost Overruns . Cost escalation also is to
be avoided. As explained in discussion of requests for
supplemental appropriations, asking for more funding carries
the latent perception of mismanagement. Programs are held
up to public scrutiny, charges of incompetence are made, and
investigations by "watchdog" agencies commence. The stigma
of perceived mismanagement also impacts other programs,
eroding the base of political support for the Navy's budget.
(3) Underperf ormance . Lastly, the Navy wants to
avoid weapon system underperformance (failing to achieve the
desired measures of military capability). Weapons that do
not work as advertised generate criticism from Congress and
the public. This increases demand for expanded control of
DOD acquisition and budget execution policies. For example,
outlined under survivability, the services' failure to
achieve measures of survivability performance for particular
weapons caused OSD to require more documentation for testing
and analysis.
Underperf ormance can be an unintended
outcome of budget negotiations, the acceptance of lesser
capability to achieve funding and program survival.
Nevertheless this type of compromise is an extreme strategy
because reduced capability may require adjustment in tactics
and the war-fighting strategy that generated the operational
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requirement. Program stretchouts, a DOD response to reduced
funding, also fits in with underperf ormance since slower
weapon deliveries translate into less military capability
within the planned timeframe.
f. Synopsis of the Extrapolated Model
Program implementation can be described as a
strategy assembly process. The Navy establishes ownership
of programs by soliciting contributions of support
components from OSD , Congress, and other organizations.
Participants react offensively or defensively, seeking gain
but avoiding blame and responsibility by asserting control
over program outcomes. Measures of successful
implementation include achievement of baseline cost,
schedule and performance parameters, and, above all, program
stability and survival. Simultaneously, the Navy attempts
to evade project delay, cost increases and underperf ormance
of the weapon. The service also wishes to minimize external
control over budget execution.
3 . Criteria for Applying the Model
Three criteria to judge the application of
strategies by the Navy in attempting to achieve A-6F program
implementation are as follows:
- Effects of institutional autonomy and independence.
- Evidence of successful assembly of strategy components
to achieve program survival, stability and success.
- Evidence of DON avoidance of project delay, cost
increases and underperf ormance.
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D. CHAPTER SUMMARY
Navy responses to controls imposed in the acquisition
process were analyzed in this chapter. Responses were
structured into categories of program design, justification,
financial manipulation and actions to influence
Congressional deliberations. A policy implementation model,
extrapolated from the work of Bardach, was developed for
application to the A-6F program in the next chapter. The
model depicts the Navy as an autonomous assembler of
strategy components, pursuing programmatic success and
avoiding failure. Three criteria were identified to
evaluate the effectiveness of strategies employed by the
Navy in the A-6F acquisition.
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IV. ACQUISITION OF THE A-6F INTRUDER II
Chapter II described the context of Congressional
control. Chapter III outlined Navy responses. A model for
understanding Navy adaptation was developed and criteria
were identified to test the appropriateness of Navy
acquisition strategies. The purpose of this chapter is to
present the case of the A-6F acquisition program as an
illustration of how Congress exercises its influence over
budget execution.
Firstly, the genesis of the A-6F upgrade is discussed.
Following the initial presentation to Congress, a primary
concern identified by the legislators is low production rate
assembly line operations. The period of 1984-1986 is
reviewed, focusing on Congressional concerns over cost and
the strategies the Navy employed to avoid mismanagement.
The FY 88 budget deliberations are discussed along with the
change in budget climate and the focus of the debate on
af f ordabi 1 i ty . This led to an authorization-appropriation
mismatch for the A-6F and resulted in OSD's termination of
the program. Finally, conclusions about control of the A-6F
procurement are presented.
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A. THE A-6F— DESCRIPTION AND PROGRAM GENESIS
1 . Descr ipt ion
The A-6 Intruder aircraft was originally designed as
an all-weather, carrier-borne, low-level attack bomber for
delivery of nuclear or conventional ordnance [Ref, 66:pp.
427-428]. Introduced in 1963, over 600 have been built by
Grumman Aerospace Corporation of Bethpage, Long Island, New
York. It has a crew of two, the pilot and bombardier/
navigator sitting side-by-side. The latest version is the
A-6E which entered use in 1970. The fleet inventory is
about 350 aircraft. It has a top speed of 700 knots, a
ceiling of 12,900 feet, and an effective combat range of 875
nautical miles. In 1978, the Target Recognition and Attack
Multi-Sensor (TRAM) was installed to integrate detecting,
tracking and weapons delivery. The heart of TRAM is a laser
designator for delivery of several types of laser guided
ordnance. In addition, TRAM allows the A-6E to accept
target designation from another aircraft or from a ground
observer. A typical weapons load is 28 5001b bombs or 3
20001b bombs. The A-6E can also carry Sidewinder missiles
for limited air-to-air defense. Harpoon missiles for
stand-off attack against ships, and the HARM missile for use
against enemy surface-to-air missile batteries.
The A-6F Intruder II is the next variant of the
aircraft. Also built by Grumman, the basic airframe is not
changed, but increased combat capability is achieved with
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upgraded avionics, weapon stations, and engines. A new
multi-mode radar improves target acquisition, recognition,
and tracking. Additional weapons stations allows for
simultaneous carrying of the Sidewinder missile and an
air-to-surface weapons load. The cockpit is entirely
redesigned. A "Heads-Up" type instrument display, in common
with the F-14 fighter, allows the pilot to look through the
canopy instead of glancing down at a panel. New
communications and navigation equipment, as well as an
upgraded electronic warfare suite, complete the avionics
upgrade. Increased thrust from two General Electric F404
engines counterbalances the increased weight from the
weapons load. To enhance survivability, the nose of the
A-6F was redesigned to present a smaller radar signature.
Also, fire detection devices throughout the airframe,
self-sealing armored fuel lines and void-filling foam
between the airframe and the fuel tanks are installed.
The A-6F was developed under a sole-source,
fixed-price contract for $497.8 million. A total buy was
established at 150 aircraft. There were to be purchases of
12 each in FY 88, 18 in FY 89, 24 or FY's 90-91, and 36 in
FY 92. Unit cost was set at $28.2 million. The initial
prototype aircraft flew on 25 August 1987.
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2 . The A-6F Program Justification and Structure
The genesis of the idea to upgrade the A-6E was a
report from the Blue Ribbon Oversight Committee on Strike
Aircraft, a panel formed by the Navy in 1983 to assess
hardware requirements and capabilities for all naval and
marine strike aircraft missions. To lend credibility to any
major decision to change the current direction of the Navy's
aircraft acquisition program, the panel solicited ideas and
proposals from industry. Grumman' s response was an offer to
enhance the A-6, with development costs estimated between
$750 million - $1.2 billion.
But, it seemed clear that a completely new design,
incorporating new technology, was going to be needed
sometime in the future. The Navy was already pursuing an
effort in this direction, called the VFMX. The committee's
report suggested scrapping it and starting again on a new
design
.
It would take many years to introduce the advanced
aircraft (called the Advanced Technology Aircraft or ATA)
into the fleet. A reasonable estimate was after 1995. To
bridge the gap, Grumman' s development proposal was
attractive. An upgraded A-6 appeared to the best solution
to span the interval to the ATA. The upgrade would include
features that increased its reliability, maintainability,
and survivability in combat. Life-cycle costs savings were
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estimated to be in the neighborhood of $1 billion over
continuing procurement of the A-6E.
Two other factors affected the decision to procure
150 A-6F's. The Blue Ribbon Committee proposed that the
number of A-6's increase from 12 to 20 per air wing. For
its part, the service had plans to stand up the 13th and
14th air wings in FY's 84 and 88 respectively, to match
growth in the carrier force to 15 ships. More A-6's per
carrier as well as more carriers in total meant increased
procurement. Therefore rather than buying increasing
numbers of an older model A-6, procuring an upgraded
aircraft appeared justified from a force modernization
V iewpoint
.
Increasing the lot buy would also pay dividends to
the Navy in decreased unit costs. Yearly procurement had
fluctuated wildly in the early 80's, from a low of two in
1980 to eight in 1983. Congress was partly to blame for
these fluctuations. It had cut the program in some years.
But, as Vice Admiral Wesley McDonald, Deputy Chief of Naval
Operations for Air Warfare, confessed to the HASC in 1982,
the Navy shared some of the responsibility because its
proposed FY 83 buy of eight aircraft was not at the most
economical rate [Ref. 67:Part 3:p. 410]. The lowest unit
cost per airplane is achieved at a production rate of 12 or
more per year. This estimate was confirmed both by the Navy
and CBO in 1984 [Ref. 68:Part 2:p. 232].
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Any decision to upgrade the A-6 would insure that
Grumman remained the largest supplier of aircraft to the
Navy. The company was already operating five production
lines. In addition to the A-6E were the F-14A Tomcat air
superiority fighter, the E-2C Hawkeye advanced early warning
aircraft, the C-2A Greyhound carrier-onboard delivery plane,
and the EA-6B Avenger electronic countermeasures aircraft.
In addition to these five lines, Grumman was heavily
committed to developing two upgrades to the F-14, the
F-14A(Plus) and the F-14D. Therefore Grumman was certain to
maintain its leading position in the naval aircraft
industry.
Assuming Congressional support for the upgrade, one
question facing the Navy in 1984 was how to transition to
the new aircraft? Would the A-6E production line need to be
shut down for two to three years to tool up for the upgrade,
therefore delaying the time when total A-6 aircraft
inventory would match the Blue Ribbon Committee's
recommendation? Or could production be smoothly integrated
so that the Navy could purchase a minimum number of A-6E's
for FY's 84-87, then commence the purchase of the upgraded
version in FY 88? The service decided on the latter
alternative. Six A6-E's would be bought each year;
beginning in FY 88, 12 A-6E upgrades would be purchased.
In summary, the Navy was proposing to buy an
improved model of a workhorse aircraft, an upgraded A-6E, as
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an interim measure while developing a completely new weapons
system, the ATA. By relying upon proven technology, the
Navy hoped to hold down costs and expedite fleet
introduction. The improvements would emphasize increased
reliability, maintainability, and survivability in combat.
The chosen aircraft is built by Grumman Aerospace, a company
that already is an major provider of planes to the Navy.
Because of the need to expand the inventory, it was
desirable to continue to buy the A-6E while the upgrade
version was in development. Purchases of the older
airplane, which were already below the most favorable
production rate, would continue at a low level. Production
rates would rise with introduction of the upgrade. These
are the essential features surrounding the Navy's
acquisition of the A-6F in 1983.
B. THE A-6F IS PRESENTED TO CONGRESS
Armed with the Blue Ribbon Committee's report, the Navy
began pursuing validation of mission need and approval of
the aircraft's development from OSD. A copy of the report
was also provided to the Appropriation and Armed Services
Committees. Therefore, although specific funding was not
being requested in the FY 84 budget for the A-6 upgrade.
Congress was aware of Navy intentions. In 1983, Navy
witnesses were questioned about the wisdom and feasibility
of the planned acquisition. The main issues of
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Congressional concern were enumerated; those issues remained
constant throughout the life of the program.
1 . Af f ordabil i ty ; Too Many Production Lines
From the beginning, af fordabili ty was an area of
contention. But the issue was not the cost of developing
the upgrade, rather keeping the A-6E line open. Because the
plan called for such low rates of production. Congress
wanted to know why it was necessary to keep procuring the
older aircraft. As Mr. Justus White, HASC professional
staff member, asked vice Admiral McDonald:
Mr. WHITE. Does it make sense to operate three
inefficient lines instead of two efficient lines? (The
A-6E) , EA-6B and F-14 lines are all in the same company.
At least two of those aircraft are in an inventory surplus
position right now.
Admiral MCDONALD. I think the total picture, Mr. White,
is in total capabilities. You can save money maybe, but
you are going to give away certain capabilities (which) we
feel in our honest and professional judgement are very
difficult to do and maintain the war fighting capability
we are tasked to perform in the future. [Ref. 67:p. 421]
A similar view was expressed by Secretary of the Navy Lehman
before the SASC:
Senator GOLDWATER. Last year this committee expressed
concern over the large number of Navy aircraft production
lines in operation. There were 13 of them and this year
there are 16
.
Of those 16 production lines, 10 are producing fewer
than one aircraft per month. In seven instances the rates
are so low that the entire overhead burden for a year is
distributed on just six or fewer aircraft....
Each year it seems we add new production lines and draw
down existing ones. Given the current budgetary pressures
we face, what steps are you willing to take to reduce the
number of Navy aircraft production lines?
Secretary LEHMAN. Senator, that is another management
dilemma. All of what you say are valid points, that low
rate production gives you higher unit cost.
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In the case of Grumman, where we actually have five
different production lines each producing at very low
rates, in fact, the overhead is shared among all the
programs so that the problem of low rate is not as bad as
it might otherwise be were a contractor producing just one
ai rplane ... However there is a countervailing
consideration ... It is better to have a warm production
line, even at six a year, as a hedge against having to
surge in wartime than to buy out a program and close down
the line. So in effect we are investing a little bit in
wartime mobilization (capability) or a surge base
mobilization (capability).... [Ref. 69:Part 2:p. 1081]
2 . The Impact of Other Aircraft Acquisitions
Meanwhile, in keeping with the intent of the Blue
Ribbon Commission's recommendations, the Navy requested
funds and began development of the follow-on, new technology
attack aircraft, the Advance Technology Attack aircraft, or
ATA. Description of this aircraft remains classified. But
at this time, support for its development appeared to be
present in Congress. Significantly, Congress felt that the
Navy should work for a common view with the Air Force on the
ATA's development. This decision reflected Congressional
reluctance to pursue two advanced attack aircraft designs.
Therefore Air Force-Navy cooperation was mandated in the
FY 87 Authorization Act [Ref. 32:p. 3840].
Temporarily, the A-6F program was drawing support
because of problems in a competitive acquisition, the F/A-18
Hornet strike fighter. The F/A-18 was just entering the
fleet as a replacement for both the A-7E light attack
aircraft and the F-4J fighter. One aircraft doing more than
one mission was a conceptual leap in force planning. But
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the F/A-18 was suffering from several weaknesses, primarily
cost overruns and underachievement of planned range and
payload. These problems were the subjects of sharp
questioning in Congress about the Navy's plans to correct
these deficiencies. Suspicions were raised that the Navy
was consigning the aircraft to the Naval Reserve as a sign
it had given up on overcoming the difficulties [Ref . 67:Part
3:p. 423]. As a result, the A-6F concluded FY 84 budget
deliberations on a positive note, as an alternative to the
apparently flagging F/A-18 [Ref. 70:pp. 106-107].
C. CONGRESSIONAL CONSIDERATION 1984-1986
The period 1984-1986 was marked by increasing
Congressional doubt about the Navy's initial justification
of the program. In addition to the production line issue,
new concerns were raised about the suitability of the
aircraft, the negotiation strategies with contractors, and
the adequacy of analysis of alternatives. The Navy
initially challenged critics to debate. But in response to
consistent disapproval over perceived insensi tivity to keep
costs in line, the Navy adopted legislative counter-
strategies. These tactics partly allayed fears of
mismanagement, and partly deflected attention towards
program strengths. But even those tactics had limited
effect in the face of the new budget climate created by
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Aircraft Suitability— The Wing Controversy
The new program was hardly underway when a problem
developed in the A-6E that, by implication, could influence
support for the follow-on aircraft. In late 1984, the Navy
discovered wing cracks on fleet airplanes. This led to a
second revision of the estimated life of the wing. The
first revision was in the late 1970's when the wing life was
extended from 2400 to over 4000 hours of flight. By late
1984, after wing fatigue was pinpointed as a cause of
several accidents, the Navy revised its estimate of wing
life down to 2250 hours. [Ref. 21:Part 4;pp. 798-799]
The shorter wing life meant that aircraft would have
to be inducted for depot level rework sooner than planned.
The result was increased maintenance costs and fewer
operational aircraft. The Navy had two plans to get
healthy. Grumman would be asked to strengthen new
production wings to bring their life to 4400 hours.
Meanwhile a new wing design, made from a composite material,
would not only extend its lifetime to 8800 hours, but would
also be able to withstand the weapons' loads planned for the
A-6F. Competition between alternative contractors and the
use of a firm fixed price contract were the strategies to be
employed to acquire the new wing. These strategies were
decided by Secretary Lehman in his capacity as the Service
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Acquisition Executive. But, the "two wing" solution would
cost additional money beyond the enacted budget. The Navy
went to Congress for supplemental funding for FY 85.
The problem for Congress was understanding how a
strengthened wing fit in with the request for a redesigned
wing. The composite wing was recognized as superior, but it
would not be delivered until FY 87. Meanwhile, aircraft
were coming off of Grumman' s production line with
strengthened wings that, in Congress' view, might or might
not reach the anticipated 4400 hour span. To some
legislators, this sounded like another mismanaged operation.
Rep. Stratton (D-NY) and Rep Holt (R-MD) tried to understand
the nature of the Navy's plan:
Admiral BUSEY . . . Basi cally , what you are saying, Mr.
Chairman, is correct. We will be putting a 2,250 hour wing
on the A-6. Because of the extended use that we see for
this, the only all weather aircraft in our inventory, we
expect to have to rewing that airplane.
We are looking at local enhancement that will get us
more service life,...
Mr. STRATTON. I don't understand the answer, because I
don't know which number of hours is involved in which
wing. We have the current wing, which is the wing which
has the problem provided a certain number of hours are
flown and then you are going out to industry to try to get
somebody to build a better wing that will last longer and
won't crack, and you are not going to have that available
for the aircraft that we are going to buy now. You are
going to have to put on the old wing . That means that
what we are doing is increasing the cost of these aircraft
because we are going to have to produce them, put one wing
on and then later on put another wing on. That is going to
cost too much. I don't think we could justify this in this
budget
.
Mrs. HOLT. It seems to me the alternative to doing what
you are doing. ..is we will not purchase the six planes
this year, Grumman' s production line will shutdown, we
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will not get the planes that we need... is Grumman located
in New York?
Mr. STRATTON. I don't think there is anything funny in
this. I think we are trying to deal with a serious matter.
What happens if we don't buy the six that you want us to
buy? Can't we put in F-14's, can't we put in EA-6 ' s?
Admiral MARTIN. That line would have to shutdown, with
attendant costs.
Mr. STRATTON. They can speed it up certainly later on,
can' t they?
Admiral MARTIN. Also, we need those aircraft in terms
of being able to perform our mission as required. [Ref.
21:Part 2:pp. 579-580]
The Navy did get funds to pursue both a quick fix
with Grumman and a long term solution with the composite
wing. On 29 July 1985, the Navy awarded a firm fixed price
contract to Boeing Military Aircraft as a winner of a
competitive purchase for the new wing. But Rep, Stratton
sponsored two amendments to the FY 86 Defense Authorization
Act requiring a warranty for wings from both Grumman and
Boeing for 4400 and 8800 hours respectively [Ref. 20:p.
603] .
2 . Congressional Concerns About Negotiations with
Contractors
Congressional distress on this issue surfaced twice
during the period 1984-1987. During early negotiations with
Grumman, Secretary Lehman had considered shutting down the
A-6 production line. The FYDP in 1983 indicated no
purchases of A-6's after FY 84. But some in Congress
interpreted the move as an attempt to win a bargaining
advantage with the contractor, instead of reflecting Navy
ambivalence about how best to transition from production of
99
the A-6E to the A-6F. [Ref. 71:p. 15] The issue was
resolved when the service requested funds for continued
procurement of the A-6E through FY 87,
The second appearance of the contractor negotiation
issue occurred over the enhancement of competition in engine
procurement. The F-404 engine for the A-6F was common with
the F/A-18 Hornet, then procured on a sole source basis from
General Electric Corporation. Production facilities were
located in West Lynn, Massachusetts. When the Navy wanted
to expand competition by employing Pratt & Whitney
Corporation as a second source, there were cries of foul
from Massachusetts legislators who saw General Electric
losing out on a lucrative contract [Ref. 21:Part l:pp.
950-952]
.
3 . The Navy Challenges Critics to Debate
But the deliberations for FY's 85-87 saw a recurring
chorus of doubt from Congress about the A-6E/F program.
There was lingering concern about the justification for
building the aircraft. Did the operational requirement
support purchasing more aircraft that might not survive
combat? The Navy met this criticism head-on.
During hearings for the FY 85 appropriation bill,
the SAC wanted to know why it was necessary to increase the
numbers of A-6's in the complement of planes aboard the
carriers. The requirements for the A-6 appeared to increase
by over 40%. The Navy responded that the decision to
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include 2 squadrons of 10 planes each in the air wing was
the result of the Blue Ribbon Oversight Committee's study to
determine the best composition for future airwings to meet
the threat of the 1990's. In the Navy's view, the
requirement was documented and recognized by OSD . The size
of the air wing was dictated by the most likely threat, an
analysis resting on the wisdom and experience of its senior
planning staff. [Ref 68:p. 214]
During the FY 85 SASC hearings, the issue of
survivability wa raised. Would the A-6 survive in combat?
The Navy answered the question bluntly. No, the A-6E
aircraft is not survivable. But the upgrade program
increases its survivability. Furthermore, as to the charge
that its an old aircraft, Assistant Secretary of the Navy
for Research, Engineering and Systems Melvyn Paisley said:
...as far as I know the Navy in general does not buy old
airplanes. I flew in an A-6 not too long ago. It was brand
new. It even smelled like a brand new car. [Ref. 72:Part
4:p. 469]
4 . Congress Searches for Its Own Alternatives
Rather than accept the Navy's word that the upgraded
A-6 was the best answer to a force modernization problem.
Congress sought its own set of alternatives. Rep. Stratton
had already cast about for some other aircraft to solve the
wing issue, as cited above. In 1985, Senator Thurmond of
the SASC wanted to know why the F/A-18 could not perform the
missions assigned to the A-6E. Admiral Martin responded
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simply that the F/A-18 was designed to replace the A-7 , not
to substitute for the A-6. The Hornet lacked an
all-weather, deep interdiction capability [Ref . 73:Part 4:p.
1823] .
The same year, in hearings before the HASC,
Mr. Anthony Battista, a professional staff member, wanted to
know if an F-14 variant would be a better choice for the
strike mission. After all, the Air Force had chosen its
fighter, the F-15, to fill an air-to-ground role. Admiral
Schoultz responded that the idea had been studied, but
rejected for several reasons. The F-14 lacks the range of
the A-6. In addition:
Admiral SCHOULTZ ... and of course, (the F-14 variant) is
going to be more expensive than the A-6. That is probably
one of the biggest drivers. Also, you develop another
community within the Navy when we don't know how we will
backfit our entire A-6 force of some 310 aircraft.
Hopefully from the upgrade of the A-6 that we are planning
we will be able to find out what we can take out of that
upgrade and very cheaply, or much more economically,
upgrade parts of about a hundred of our late model A-6's
or late-year production A-6's, to bring that force up to
standards. [Ref. 72:Part 4:p. 902]
Senator Kennedy, during the hearings on the FY 85
authorization bill, wanted to know why the Marines could not
help make up the shortfall in A-6 aircraft by transferring
their A-6's to the Navy. The Marines would replace them
with F/A-18* s. In a move to split the Marine's from the
Navy's position, he asked:
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Senator KENNEDY. What is the position of the Marines on
the proposed modernization of the A-6E?
General FITCH. We support the improvement of the A-6E.
Senator KENNEDY. Just your own personal opinion, not
the official Marine Corps position, would you consider a
two-seat F/A-18 modified to perform the all-weather attack
mission to be an acceptable replacement for the A-6?
General FITCH. In my personal opinion, if the aircraft
were in the proper configuration, it could be. [Ref.
74:Part 3:p. 1533]
The result of this line of questioning was a decision to
fund the beginning development of a limited night attack
capability for the F/A-18.
5 . The Af
f
ordabili ty Issue Raised Again
But the most contentious issue was aff ordabili ty.
For Congress, it revolved around two points. Firstly, the
upgraded A-6 competed with other aircraft programs for
limited dollars. There had to be some evidence that the
Navy was prioritizing its requirements for all of its
airplanes if it wanted sympathetic treatment. Secondly, the
number of open aircraft production lines, and the small
numbers of aircraft coming off those lines, drove up unit
costs. Congress could not let the Navy "raid the Treasury"
through its own poor planning and mismanagement. These
concerns were most clearly enunciated in the SASC.
Senator Goldwater's remarks, in 1984, to Admiral
Watkins and General Kelley were quite blunt concerning the
f i rst point
:
Senator GOLDWATER. . .but what I am trying to bring out
is if the Navy wants to go ahead with plans to modernize
the avionics of their three major aircraft, the F-14, the
A-6, and the F-18, it is going to take quite a bit of
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money... if you come to a decision that would allow us to
go ahead with modernizing the avionics of the A-6's, I
don't think there will be trouble for the Navy. Otherwise,
having to buy an old airplane for two outfits with added
cost for improvement might not sell. [Ref. 74:Part 2:p.
886]
As far back as 1983, the Navy conceded that it was
operating too many production lines. From the high of 16
lines in FY 84, it promised to reduce the lines to 14 in
FY 86, 12 in FY 87, and 11 in FY 89. Yet by the FY 86
budget hearings, it had failed to carry out this pledge.
There were still 16 production lines open, although closings
were planned so that the numbers decreased to eight lines by
1995. Admiral Martin explained in his prepared statement:
The Navy is fully aware of, and shares. Congressional
concern over the number of production lines open to
provide aircraft for naval aviation [Ref. 75:Part 4:p.
136] .
Secretary Lehman, in 1984, blamed Congress for the
problem:
Senator THURMOND. Mr. Secretary, the Navy buys planes
in small quantities from numerous production lines which
increases costs. You have testified before that you will
terminate some of these lines. When will this begin?
Secretary LEHMAN. Aircraft procurement plans are a
compromise between force requirements and af f ordabili ty.
Production rates are increased whenever possible and
production lines subsequently closed. Sixteen procurement
lines are necessary to satisfy force level expansion,
eliminate short term deficiencies and achieve
modernization ... If Congress didn't continue to cut our
budget requests we could save the taxpayers much money in
unit cost savings through more efficient production rates,
[Ref. 74:Part 2:p. 918]
Veiled threats about Congressional action were also injected
into the discussion:
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Senator BINGAMAN...I am concerned, I guess, after being
here 2 years, that it is easier to plan to eliminate
production lines than it is to get them eliminated.
What would your reaction be to some direction from this
committee or from the Congress that you do in fact reduce
the number of production lines...?
Admiral MARTIN. ..I would be opposed to direction...
without considering the requirements involved. I would
think that the production lines that have remained open
have done so for very real and good reasons and so to
answer your question specifically, I would not like to see
closures mandated. [Ref. 73:Part 4:pp. 1864-1865]
That reducing production rates below an economic
production quantity results in higher unit costs is a
generally understood concept. But trying to measure the
exact increase of such a move requires a base from which to
calculate the change in costs. The Navy's contention is
that recurring flyaway cost is the best measure. In the
Navy's parlance, this is the cost of one aircraft on the
runway, gassed up, ready to take-off. Non-recurring costs,
as well as costs of spares, training, maintenance
facilities, and personnel, are all germane, but should not
be included in the analysis to determine unit cost for
comparison of economic production quantities. Congress has
not had any difficulty with accepting this analysis. But
the myriad of different ways to add up the costs of an
aircraft, all usually included on a view-graph when the
plane is being briefed during hearings, can lead to some
confusion:
Senator RUDMAN . . . Your flyaway cost is what on that
(F/A-18)?
Admiral SCHOULTZ. $21 million, it is on the right-hand
side of the chart.
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Senator RUDMAN. There are other costs that are not
reflected in that $21 million.
Admiral SCHOULTZ. Yes, sir.
Senator RUDMAN. If you were to reflect those costs and
put it against the present projected unit buy, do you have
that number?
Admiral SCHOULTZ. It looks like $33.3 million.
Senator RUDMAN. Is it $33.3 million if you take all of
those non-recurring costs and spread them on this base?
Admiral SCHOULTZ. Yes, sir, that is the program unit
cost. The airframe, the engine, and the avionics, the
airplane sitting at the end of the runway, that is the
recurring flyaway cost, and that is what we are counting
as the airplane. If you add the nonrecurring costs, and
the ancillary equipment, then it gives you a total
flyaway. If you add support and advance procurement, you
get weapon system costs. Add initial spares, and you get
procurement costs. If you add the research and
development, and military construction, then you get
program costs. If you divide the program by the total
number of airplanes that you are going to buy, you get a
program unit cost....
Senator RUDMAN. So it would have to be said that, on
the basis on which you are buying A-6E' s it is a very
expensive program we are running compared to buying a
brand new aircraft, the F/A-18.
Admiral SCHOULTZ. Primarily because you are buying a
smaller number.
Senator RUDMAN. Exact ly. . .Mr . Chairman, I think this
chart probably illustrates as much as anything the
enormous costs that we are having because of very small
numbers, which we are going to be forced into doing more
of. The net impact on the aircraft acquisition budget is
going to be a lot fewer airplanes and a lot more money.
That is a very interesting chart. [Ref. 68:Part 2:p. 189]
Another example is Admiral Martin's detailed explanation to
Senator Kennedy about economic production rates for several
airplane types, which took up 3 pages of testimony during
the FY 86 authorization hearings [Ref. 73:Part 4:pp.
1870-1872]
.
6 . The Navy Designs a Counter-Strategy
The Navy's response to this threat to the A-6E/F
program had to be tough and convincing. If cost savings
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could not be demonstrated by closing down uneconomical
production lines, then some other means had to be found to
show that the program was not too expensive to afford. The
means chosen were already at hand. The service would
espouse the goals of maintainability, reliability, and
commonality, and show positive achievements of
ever-increasing measures of those goals. Admiral Busey told
the HAC in FY 85 deliberations, that the upgrade would
incorporate major "off-the-shelf" enhancements, such as
digital avionics and a new engine, that would reduce direct
maintenance manhours per flight hour by 25% [Ref. 76:Part
6:p. 336]. Over the lifetime of the aircraft, life-cycle
cost avoidance was computed at over $1 billion. Commonality
within the avionics would be over 90% between the A-6F, the
F-14D, and the AV-8B. This would be achieved, not by
sole-source contracts, but through competition. Over 40% of
the A-6F would be competitively procured, driving down
anticipated costs [Ref. 76:Part 5:p. 191]:
Mrs. BYRON. Are we mandated to have a competition?
Admiral BUSEY. We believe we will get some significant
pressures through competition to drive the cost down to be
favorable to the taxpayer.
Mrs. BYRON. We will keep your feet to the fire. [Ref.
72:Part 4:p. 664]
The most important characteristic of the
acquisition, however, was to be the firm fixed-price
contract for development of the A-6F. An undef initized
contract was signed with Grumman in August 1984. In May of
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1985, that contract was capped at $350 million. After
competition, General Electric was chosen to provide the F404
engine, the same as in the F/A-18 . Along with the engine
and Navy in-house testing, total development costs were held
to $500 million, considerably less than the $750
million-$1.2 billion range initially suggested by the Blue
Ribbon Oversight Committee.
With these main selling points. Congressional
criticism was overcome. Both the A-6E procurement and the
A-6F development program were funded as requested from FY 84
through FY 87.
7 . The Budget Climate Changes
But the sales pitch in one year can become a
liability later. Beginning in the budget deliberations for
FY 87, two concerns surfaced about the nature of all firm
fixed-price contracts. As explained in Chapter III under
acquisition program design, these type of agreements are a
means of achieving program stability. The product to be
delivered is well described and the contractor knows the
level of effort necessary to complete the contract. Just as
the Navy assumes the contractor will fulfill his obligation
to deliver, so the contractor assumes that their will be no
modifications or cancellations. Termination or modification
costs can be prohibitive for fixed-price type contracts.
Firstly, GAO found that fixed-price type contracts
appear to be inappropriate if significant risk exists for
108
schedule delay and underperf ormance due to the unreliability
of the government's cost estimates and the undetermined
quantity of weapons to be delivered. Examples found that
illustrated the problems were the Navy's FY 89 Submarine
Combat System (FY89CS) , the Army's Line-Of-Sight Forward
Heavy Weapon (LOS-F-H) and the joint Navy-Air Force Advanced
Medium Range Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAAM) . Although cost
growth was successfully contained, GAO believed that the
services could be induced to continue programs not
performing satisfactorily in tests. [Ref. 43:pp. 26, 63-64,
80-83]
Secondly, the two Gramm-Rudman-Hol lings Acts of 1985
and 1987 required all federal agencies to search for means
to reduce outlays. In a bid to reduce the budget deficit to
zero, the President was required to submit a plan to
Congress to bring outlays and revenues closer together by
reducing budget authority. If the President and Congress
could not agree on such a plan, the Comptroller General was
empowered to make the decision. The comprehensive and
resolute nature of Gramm-Rudman meant that it was felt in
every Navy appropriation and program. In the procurement
accounts, the fear was that some fixed-priced contracts
would have to be renegotiated or outright terminated to hold
outlays within the goals. If contracts were cancelled,
termination costs would be incurred. If agreements were
renegotiated, bargaining would be in a "sole-source"
109
environment and not conducive to keeping costs down.
Finally, if FFP contracts were later to be reopened (perhaps
as a result of Congress again reversing its strategy for
deficit reduction), price increases were inevitable. In
this kind of "no-win" situation, the risk was considered so
great to the Navy's budget plans that it informally
requested legislation to exempt FFP contracts from
Gramm-Rudman reductions [Ref. 77:Part 5:p. 490].
Gramm-Rudman threw not just the A-6F, but the entire
aircraft acquisition plan into doubt:
Senator SASSER...By the final year of Gramm-Rudman, in
1991 I see the Navy plans to increase the number of
aircraft procured by 55 percent.
Now, how does the Navy realistically expect to achieve
that goal in view of the budget trends of fewer dollars
for defense?
Admiral MARTIN. We are looking at trying to maintain,
within the fiscal constraints that we have, a balanced and
affordable program. Our budget that we are laying out for
the 5-year defense plan is one that we think is achievable
and is executable within the fiscal constraints that we
have. But it is going to take a lot of moving and very
careful management of our resources. [Ref. 77:Part 2:p.
206]
The Gramm-Rudman-Hol lings Deficit Reduction Act of
1985 would later be overturned by the Supreme Court on the
issue of the separation of powers under the Constitution,
the Comptroller General's independence from the legislature.
But the policy implementation implications did not
disappear. Congress deliberated the Gramm-Rudman-Hol lings
Deficit Reduction Act of 1987 in tandem with the FY 88/89
budget.
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D. FY 88 BUDGET DELIBERATIONS
There were two factors which affected the way Congress
would consider the new budget for FY 88. Section 1405 of
the FY 86 Defense Authorization Act mandated that the
president submit a two-year budget to Congress for defense.
From the viewpoint of many in the legislature, this was a
victory for those tired of continuous budgeting. From the
vantage of the DOD, it promised a measure of program
stability. Furthermore, a new Congress took its seats after
the 1986 midterm elections. The Senate, in the hands of a
Republican majority since President Reagan's election in
1981, now shifted to Democratic dominance. Committee
chairmanships changed as Senators Sam Nunn (D-GA) and John
Stennis (D-MS) became leaders of the Armed Services
Committee and the Defense Subcommittee of the Appropriations
Committee, respectively. In the House, the Democrats were
returned with even larger majorities.
1 . Proceedings Within the Armed Services And
Appropriation Committees
On 20 January 1987, Sen. Nunn called the SASC to
order to hear testimony on the role of resource constraints
in the formulation of U.S. military strategy. This was a
significant departure from prior years that started out with
posture statements from the Secretary of Defense and the
Chairman of the JCS. The principal witness was Dr. Lawrence
Korb, former Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower,
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Installations and Logistics. His prescription for coping
with restraints was a five point program:
- Both Congress and the President must recognize the
existence of a constrained fiscal environment.
- While real defense growth was out of the question, real
decline should also be avoided.
- Force structure goals would have to be altered.
- Development of new weapons systems would have to be
delayed; and 5) marginal programs had to be eliminated.
[Ref. 78:p. 363]
At the same time, a report in Aviation Week and
Space Technology cited OSD telling Secretary Lehman to
declassify parts of the ATA program, so that Congress could
look at cost estimates and general performance figures
without the national security encumbrances. The ATA,
because of its application of new technology, was still in
development, and many years away from production. The
rationale for OSD' s action was to bring the Navy in line
with the Air Force. Since the latter 's Advanced Technology
Fighter (ATF) was recently declassified, the Navy should
also declassify its advance plane, to advance a spirit of
cooperation between the branches of government. The article
speculated that the reason for Lehman's reluctance was that
a "black" program served to defend more visible acquisition
efforts. If the ATA was a successful initiative, its
visibility would make it more difficult to defend less
successful programs from Congressional budget cutters. [Ref.
79:p. 17]
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Fiscal Year 88 marked the first year of a Navy
request for procurement monies for the A-6F. Twelve
airplanes were requested in the budget, also the first time
the minimum economic rate of production was requested of the
A-6 in more than 6 years. The first prototype had not yet
flown, but Congressional concerns at this time seemed to
revolve around a minor slip in the date for its initial
flight. Grumman requested a 3 month delay in order to solve
problems in programming the new avionics computer. Before
the HASC in February 1987, Secretary Lehman termed the
problems as minor, and said that the slip was being
challenged by the Navy as unnecessary. In any case, he said
that the firm fixed-price contract prevented any escalation
in price. The Government's exposure to risk was minimal.
[Ref. 80:Part 2:pp. 312, 334]
Later that month, Lehman announced his resignation.
His replacement was James Webb, the former Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs.
By late March, though, the first signs appeared that
the procurement plan for the A-6F was unravelling. The Navy
announced a new program under consideration to remanuf acture
A-6E's to A-6F's. Speculation was that this preceded a
cutback in A-6F procurement. Given the current budget
atmosphere, this appeared to be a strategy to maintain
planned force levels at reduced cost. [Ref. 81:pp. 18-20]
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Pressure then reappeared from CBO and OSD . CBO
released a new report concerning economic production rates
of weapons systems DoD-wide (see Appendix H) . The study
claimed that the A-6E had a minimum economic production
quantity of 12 airplanes per year. Previously, the Navy's
five-year average procurement was only eight per year.
Evidence of OSD ' s flagging support for the follow-on A-6F
was provided by Dr. Robert Costello, Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Acquisition and Logistics. In testimony before
the SASC, he was quoted calling the study "an excellent job
of financial analysis" and that it "should be looked at as a
vigorous scrubbing of DoD weapons buying management." Sen.
Carl Levin (D-MI) explored the limits of collaboration by
asking for a priority list of procurements. However, in
keeping with Secretary Weinberger's longstanding refusal to
provide such a list, Dr. Costello declined the invitation.
[Ref . 82:p. 77]
.
In spite of this line of questioning, in April the
HASC approved funding of the A-6F procurement at 12 and 18
aircraft for the two years respectively [Ref, 83:p. 47].
But consistent with the spirit of former Secretary Korb's
testimony that some new weapon systems would have to be
delayed to save money, the HASC chose to eliminate funds
from the ATA program. Later, the HAC accepted this outcome
from its counterpart committee and appropriated monies in
conformity with the HASC report. Moreover, the HAC
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applauded the Navy's efforts to procure both new A-6F's and
remanuf actured A-6E's because of "...very attractive pricing
options." [Ref. 84:p. 143]
The SASC report of 8 May 1987 came as a surprise.
It took exactly the opposite tack from the HASC, eliminating
procurement of the A-6F and authorizing continued support
for the ATA:
The committee is concerned that even after the F model
is developed that the A-6 would still be a very vulnerable
aircraft because of its subsonic speed and very large
radar image, which makes it vulnerable to antiaircraft
missiles and gun fire. The new engines and new electronics
would not appreciably reduce that vulnerability. The
Navy's own analysis shows the A-6 vulnerability to be
unacceptably high.
The committee is also concerned that new construction
A-6F's are receiving disproportionate emphasis in Navy
planning. The Navy is proposing to buy 150 A-6F's, which
together with the development costs will each $6.5
billion. Because of the budget constraints, the Navy has
no plans to upgrade the more than 340 early model A-6s. By
1995, only one-third of the A-6 fleet will be "modern"
while two-thirds will be obsolete....
The committee believes that it is not possible to
proceed with both programs (the A-6F and the ATA) with
today's budget realities. If the Navy's Aviation
Procurement Account receives no real growth during the
next five years, some $4.3 billion or 12% will have to be
removed from the current five year plan. The committee
believes such an outcome would be devastating, but not
entirely unrealistic in light of the current budget
env ironmen t
,
The committee directs the Navy to terminate further
development and procurement of the A-6F aircraft and to
develop a program to upgrade the A-6E's in the fleet.
While the ATA is an expensive program, the committee
believes the vulnerability of the A-6 justifies
expeditious development of the ATA. [Ref. 85:p. 36]
The SAC concurred in this judgement and appropriations were
in keeping with the SASC report.
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The SASC report clearly placed opposition to the
A-6F within the Senate, their objections based on factors
related to vulnerability and af f ordabili ty. In spite of
repeated Navy efforts in prior budget deliberations to
demonstrate that the A-6F was a carefully managed program,
which successfully met its baseline measures of
effectiveness for survivability and affordabili ty, the SASC
had swept the arguments aside to conclude that the ATA was a
better investment. Recall that the ATA was still a
classified initiative and had not progressed beyond the
Demonstration and Validation stage of its acquisition. Thus
the SASC was banking on the future success of the ATA, but
with attendant technological risk.
An alternative judgement of the SASC s position
reflects the opposition of the chairman. Sen. Sam Nunn
(D-GA) . Sen. Nunn echoed the longstanding SASC opposition
to continued operation of low economic quantity production
lines. Navy efforts to convince him, and the SASC, went to
great lengths to find a persuasive measure of program
management effectiveness, including comparison of the lower
production costs per pound of the A-6 to the F/A-18 , and
adding the production numbers of the EA-6B to those of the
A-6 to show increased production line efficiency. When
coupled with the aff ordabili ty issue raised by the ATA's
continuing development, survivability appears to be less
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important a factor in the SASC decision to terminate the
A-6F program.
2 . Proceedings of the Joint Conference Committee on the
FY 88/89 Defense Authorization Act
The House and Senate Armed Services Committees
reported out their respective bills on 15 April and 8 May
1987 respectively. But floor debate and reconciliation of
the differing versions had to wait as contentiousness within
the Senate, regarding proposed strategic arms control
language, prevented any final agreement on military
authorizations. Fiscal Year 88 began on 1 October without a
Defense appropriation or authorization legislation.
When the House-Senate authorization joint conference
finally met in mid-October, the situation for the A-6F had
changed dramatically. Several events were factors in any
decision. With Secretary Lehman's resignation, much of the
support for the aircraft had evaporated from within the
Navy. The threat to cancel ATA funding, represented by the
House version of the authorization bill, appeared to be a
more substantial menace to the Navy's aircraft procurement
plan. Said one senior DOD official:
There is only so much money in the planned budget, and the
A-6F has the lowest priority among Navy tactical aircraft
programs. It is a program that would be nice to have, but
it cannot be afforded. The Navy and Congress cannot
continue to take money from each aircraft program. A hard
decision to kill some programs has to be made. [Ref. 86:p.
20]
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Another development was the emerging interrelationship of
the F-14D, the ATA, and the Air Force's ATE. The
development schedules for the two latter high technology
airplanes were slipping. The Navy had advanced the schedule
of the F-14D to counter this. Some of the additional money
necessary to accomplish the strategy appeared to come from
the ATA program. In order to keep the ATA on track, the
A-6F program was considered for reduction.
Then, on 19 October 1987, national economic
considerations became a factor. The stock market fell over
567 points in one day, the largest loss ever in the Dow
Jones Industrial Average. Analysts were quick to point to
the budget deficit as a contributing cause. The next day.
President Reagan announced a "budget summit" with the
Congressional leadership. All spending and revenue
categories were on the table, except Social Security.
In this confusing atmosphere, the joint conference
committee had difficulties sorting out the possible and the
impossible. By early November, they seemed to have crafted
a two tier approach to budgeting for FY 88/89 to meet all of
the uncertainties. The high tier provided for spending at
$296 billion, a reduction from the President's request of
more than $25 billion. The low tier was set at $289
billion. Neither level saw an increase in spending to cover
inflation during FY 87.
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But the issue of cancelling individual programs was
left up to the senior leadership on the Armed Services
Committees of both chambers. Recall that the House and
Senate had taken opposite positions regarding the A-6F and
the ATA. Now word leaked that there was agreement that two
attack aircraft programs in the production phase of
acquisition were close to termination: the A-6F and the
Marine's AV-8B. The former appeared headed for outright
cancellation, while the latter was funded only in the high
tier. The understanding regarding the A-6F was quickly
reached. Recalled a professional staff member, "within 5
minutes the logic of the Senate position was so evident that
the House conferees showed no reluctance to retreat from
their prior endorsement of the A-6F" [Ref. 87],
The Marine Corps, though, mounted an intensive
lobbying effort to salvage their airplane. At a Capitol
Hill party celebrating the Corp's birthday, the Marine
Commandant vowed to take whatever action necessary to
reverse the decision [Ref. 88:p. 32]. Rep. David Martin
(R-NY) a former Marine pilot, then garnered enough support
among HASC Republicans to threaten opposition to the
legislation. On 5 November, HASC Chairman Les Aspin told
his Republican counterpart. Rep. Bill Dickinson, to round up
the necessary votes for conference agreement. Aspin
threatened to reopen issues already settled with the SASC
and redraw the legislation more in line with Democratic
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party views if Republican support was not forthcoming. The
showdown never took place. On 9 November, the AV-8B issue
became a moot point when it was reported that the budget
summit would most likely settle on a figure for defense
spending above the lower tier determined by the joint
conference committee. [Ref. 89:pp. 2796-2797]
The joint conference reported out a defense
authorization bill for FY 88 on 19 November, In language
nearly identical with the SASC report of 8 May, the
conference set forth the "...future of Navy aviation." [Ref.
90:p. 306] (See Appendix D) The A-6F would not be funded.
The Navy was given two alternatives: search for a cheaper
aircraft than the A-6F or purchase 11 A-6E's. The Marines
could buy AV-8B's, but should give their A-6's to the Navy
to relieve any A-6 shortfall. They could also pursue
development of their two-seat version of the F/A-18 Hornet.
Public speculation had already decided that the Marines were
more interested in an F/A-18D (Plus) because it simplified
logistics support for an all F/A-18 strike force [Ref. 86:p,
20], Regarding the A-6F cancellation. Chairman Aspin was
quoted, saying "with tight budget over the next few years,
we can expect to face such decisions again," Chairman Nunn
explained his own rationale, that the March 1987 CBO report
on various weapons systems procurement rates indicated that






The budget summit agreement was announced on 20
November 1987. It provided for $292 billion in defense
spending, an amount that could be accommodated within the
authorization legislation although the Armed Services
committees had two other versions of authorizations ready to
unveil if necessary. But the same certainty regarding
constraints on authorizations did not carry over into
appropriations. An appropriation bill for FY 88 had yet to
be enacted. The 13 bills had been wrapped into an Omnibus
Appropriation Act in order to save time and to coordinate
the implementation of the budget agreement. The legislation
was in Joint Conference. Although the leadership of
Congress had concluded the budget agreement, there was
speculation that the rank and file would not abide by the
arrangement [Ref. 92 :p. 2860].
For defense, the conferees were faced with some
unpleasantness. Although the high tier of the FY 88 Defense
Authorization Act was established at $296 billion, the grand
total of programs authorized summed to $299.1 billion. As
explained in Chapter II under characterizations of the
budget process, in the past such a situation was an
invitation for appropriations to "guard the Treasury" by
slashing spending. But the budget agreement had fulfilled
that role. Now the issue at hand was, in light of dwindling
resources, who would set the agenda for defense spending?
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Appropr iators intended to exercise whatever power they had
to reshape defense expenditure. Organizational conflict
within Congress would be intensified.
Recall that the HAC and SAC had concurred earlier in
the decisions of their respective Armed Services Committees
regarding continuance of the A-6F program: funded in the
House, terminated in the Senate, In the circumstances
resulting from the deliberations of the authorization joint
conference in November, Rep. Bill Chappell (D-FL) saw the
opportunity to guarantee survival for the A-6F. In a clear
challenge to the Armed Services Committees, he was
instrumental in keeping funding intact for the attack
aircraft [Ref. 93:p. 3127]. In the haste to make Christmas
recess, the omnibus legislation was approved by both
chambers and signed by President Reagan on 22 December 1987.
Critics of Rep. Chappell' s support of the A-6F have
pointed to intensive lobbying by Grumman Corporation as the
motivation for his actions. The Congressman's office
counters that he disagrees with the SASC's rational for
recommending termination of the airplane's production,
citing the increasing average age of A-6E's in operation
[Ref. 94]
4 . Program Termination
The Armed Services committees reacted swiftly. In a
joint letter to Defense Secretary Frank Carlucci, Sen. Nunn
and Rep. Aspin stated their "unequivocal opposition" to any
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funding of the A-6F, regardless of the impossibility of
resolving the issue before the start of the next budget
cycle. [Ref. l:p. 28]
The Navy was clearly ambivalent about the A-6F. On
one side were some in the aviation community who saw the
aircraft as a vital link to the ATA. On the other were
those who felt the ATA was clearly the higher priority, that
combat readiness would not suffer substantially if the A-6F
were terminated. Given the scarcity of financial resources
now foreseen, the major threat would be risking funding
problems for both aircraft. Secretary of the Navy Webb
appeared to side with the latter group when he signed a
memorandum to Secretary of Defense Carlucci on 10 December
indicating the Navy would prefer to cancel the A-6F program
in the FY 89 budget. [Ref. l:p. 28].
Frank Carlucci was named on 5 November to replace
Caspar Weinberger as Secretary of Defense. In his
confirmation hearings before the SASC, he vowed to take two
approaches to trim the defense budget to meet Congressional
objectives. Firstly, he would reduce active duty personnel
rather than skimp on maintenance and training. In his view,
he was trading force size for effectiveness. Secondly, he
favored buying fewer different kinds of weapons, so that
those built could produced at higher rates. He said he
recognized the problems with declining unit costs and that
the usual Pentagon answers to resource constraints would not
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be effective. In particular, he singled out program
stretch-outs as a favorite DOD strategy that required
correction. [Ref. 95:p. 2798]
In a news release of 18 February 1988, OSD presented
an amended FY 88/89 DOD budget. It lamented that the FY 88
budget process precluded the enactment of a budget that
would have permitted DOD to achieve economical procurements,
program stability, efficiencies in operations, and to
preserve the rebuilding of military capabilities that began
in 1981. Nevertheless, other factors dictated a reduction
of resources and the requirement to replan their
distribution. The priorities for reconfiguring the defense
budget were people, readiness, and efficient acquisition.
Force structure reductions, program terminations and
deferrals, reduced research and development, and
end-strength cuts provided the monies for the priorities.
Program terminations were decided on the basis of
af fordabil i ty and the existence of viable alternatives. In
this latter category was the A-6F. [Ref. 96:p. 4]
The OSD decision failed to completely resolve the
authorization-appropriation mismatch. The FY 88/89
Authorization Act left the choice to the Navy to either
purchase 11 A-6E's or start a more affordable A-6
development program. The Omnibus Appropriation Act for
FY 88 specified funds available for only purchasing the
A-6F. Thus obligation authority remains suspended until the
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Navy decides on which course of action in accordance with
the authorization act to follow, and requests reprogramming
authority from Congress. Currently, the Navy is trying to
build support for an A-6G development program. Rather than
procure an entirely new aircraft, the basic airframe of
existing A-6E's would be modified and upgraded to reflect
the configuration of the A-6F. Congressional confirmation
of this proposal has yet to be determined.
E. CHAPTER CONCLUSIONS
The conclusions on control of the A-6F program are as
follows
:
1 . The Navy's Perspective
The Navy concludes that the A-6F was terminated by
three factors: budgetary constraints, the lack of a unified
position in the service, and the intervention of OSD to
terminate the program [Ref. 97, Ref. 98]. The budgetary
constraints relate not to those arising from the budget
summit agreement of November 1987, because the
appropriations conferees had found room for both the A-6F
and the ATA in its version of the FY 88 budget after the
presidential bargain was set. Rather, restrictions
resulting from attempts to reduce the budget deficit in the
climate engendered by Gramm-Rudman are a key aspect of the
project's demise. The lack of a unified position within the
service was evidenced in the aviation community's
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ambivalence regarding the priority of the ATA. Finally, the
opposition of the SASC and the termination decision of OSD
was resented by the Navy program office because it expected
to receive continued political support from these
organizations
.
The lack of program stability for the A-6F is a
source of much indignation in the Navy. OSD is viewed as
bowing to the political will of Congress instead of
resisting micromanagement of force structure decisions and a
violation of the Navy's independence to pursue its own
course of action. The autonomy of the Navy, in the Navy's
view, has been infringed upon by Armed Services Committees
of Congress in their choosing to dictate the future force
structure of naval aviation, and by OSD prevention of the
Navy's appeal for the A-6F in the FY 89 budget.
2 . An Alternative Perspective
Close study of the A-6F case also yields some
alternative conclusions concerning the termination of the
program.
Firstly, the departure of John Lehman as Secretary
of the Navy may have contributed significantly to the
project's decline in political feasibility as Lehman had
been a keen and effective supporter of the project.
Secondly, the Navy was unable to settle the
production line issue with Congress. From program inception
in 1983 through authorization deliberations in November
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1987, the Navy never laid to rest the issue that it operated
too many production lines, turning out aircraft at lower
than economic rates. Although counter-strategies to defend
the program were developed by the Navy, the SASC viewed them
as sound management practices that only prevented cost
growth due to technological risk. The counter-strategies
did not prevent cost growth due to inefficient production
rates
.
The Navy did not communicate effectively the
operational requirements for the A-6F so as to make it seem
affordable. The aircraft was promoted as a transition to
the ATA. In that light, it had to be sold as a relatively
cheap way to bridge the operational gap. But the Navy
planned to fly the A-6 for many years in the future, as
demonstrated by its larger role in the new carrier air wing.
The program was not perceived by Congress as a financial
bargain, with life cycle costs estimated by the SASC in the
FY 88/89 authorization bill report to be $6.5 billion. Thus
there was a mismatch in the promotion of the operational
requirement of the A-6F to Congress and the budgetary
implications of approving the aircraft's procurement.
There also was a carry-over of weaknesses of the
A-6E to the A-6F. It was the A-6E which had been procured
at low economic production rates, and it was the A-6E that
required fitting of a new wing. It was also the A-6E's
combat vulnerabilities that generated the new operational
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requirements for a more survivable aircraft. The SASC
concluded that the survivability improvements made in the
A-6F were not sufficient to overcome the inherent weaknesses
of the basic A-6 aircraft design. It is possible that the
image of the A-6E before Congress was melded into that of
the A-6F. Senator Nunn confused the two aircraft, as shown
in his reaction to the CBO report of March 1987 regarding
economic production rates. The stigma of the predecessor
aircraft apparently was difficult to shake.
Finally, the Navy assumed that OSD participation for
A-6 program review and approval would be favorable for
program stability and survival. But OSD support waned
throughout 1987, as evidenced by the direction it gave to
Secretary Lehman to declassify the ATA, and by Dr.
Costello's positive remarks concerning the CBO study of
March 1987. Secretary Carlucci's decision to kill the
program confirmed a trend already underway. The lingering
bitterness in the Navy over program termination may indicate
that OSD support was taken for granted despite signs that
OSD approval was absent for the A-6 project.
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V. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS
The preceding chapters have described the context of
Congressional control and Navy response, suggested an
adapted model for understanding Navy responses, and
presented a case history of the A-6F Intruder II aircraft.
This chapter applies the model and articulates the results
of testing institutional interactions in the A-6F
acquisition to assess conformity to behavior predicted by
the model. Research questions posed in Chapter I are
answered. Conclusions are presented, grouped in categories
of Congressional control and its use. Navy responses to
control, and specific findings in the A-6F acquisition.
Finally, areas for further research are discussed.
A. APPLICATION OF IMPLEMENTATION PROCESS CRITERIA
1 . Participant Autonomy
Autonomy enables institutions to engage in strategy
development, to assemble program strategy components, and to
negotiate the terms of participation in the implementation
process. Program strategy components are the building
blocks of the program implementation "machine," namely
administrative mechanisms, facilities, design services,
clearances, coordination processes with the other uniform
services, and project review and approval, among others.
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When the Navy approaches Congress, the service primarily
seeks political support and funding from the legislative
branch. Autonomy enables a sense of ownership and
establishes offensive momentum to insure both program
survival through the redundant Congressional budget review
process, and to ward off efforts to micromanage the
operation of the program. Alternatively, the freedom to
give or withhold program implementation strategy components
is a factor of political bargaining that helps determine the
conditions for participation in the implementation process.
The implementation model applied to acquisition programs
assesses the Navy's assertion of ownership of programs and
Congressional control over programmatic processes and
outcomes
.
The Navy demonstrated autonomy in the A-6F
acquisition, manifested in the decision processes that
arrived at the program's justification and design, the
central position assumed by Secretary John Lehman as the
principal marketing executive before Congress, and the
aborted campaign to rescue the program from termination.
Most acquisition programs are born within the uniform
service's POM processes, not identified for them by Congress
or the Presidential administration (the Strategic Defense
Initiative being an exception). The Blue Ribbon Committee
on Strike Aircraft was assembled at the Navy's instigation
to review alternatives for strike warfare hardware designs
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and capabilities. The service decided to emphasize
improvements in maintainability and survivability as
measures of program success. Furthermore, Secretary Lehman
directed the employment of acquisition strategies such as
firm fixed-price contracts, competition in the new wing
fabrication, and the commonality of weapons systems with
other frontline Navy aircraft. His highly visible role as
chief spokesman for the A-6F to Congress reinforced the
independence of the Navy to manage programs. Finally, the
still-born proposal to use appropriated funds in the FY 88
budget as implied authorization for A-6F production
indicates Navy reluctance to terminate the aircraft
procurement. The Navy assumed an offensive position
vis-a-vis Congress to design, administer, and sell the A-6F
ai rplane
.
Congress asserted its independence by demanding
control over funding and outcomes of the program. This is
evident in Rep. Stratton's amendments to the FY 86
Authorization Act to force the Navy to seek warranties from
both Grumman and Boeing on the hourly lifetime of the A-6E
wings. The Navy testified that testing affirmed the
improvements in life span. Congress preferred the more
stringent control of law, directing that a warranty be
negotiated for a specific lifetime.
Sub-organizational autonomy also was present.
Institutions are composed of sub-organizations that enjoy
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some freedom to pursue different goals. An example is the
rivalry expressed in committee conflict within Congress. The
ambivalence of the Navy's aviation community regarding the
priority of the A-6F in relation to the ATA also is
indicative of sub-organizational autonomy.
2 . Assembly of Program Components
As discussed in Chapter III, the advocacy process
includes a search for the correct acquisition program design
and justification, and attempts to influence Congressional
deliberations. These elements are bound together into a
promotional strategy to achieve program survival and
stabil i ty.
The Navy justified the A-6F as a low technological
risk follow-on aircraft to bridge the gap to the more
challenging ATA. Because it was sold as a transitory weapon
system, the A-6F program required emphasis on decreasing
cost and quick introduction into the fleet. These were
present in the choice of the firm fixed-price contracting
vehicle, the shortened development time, and the projected
life cycle cost analysis.
Congressional critics insisted that having a large
number of open production lines producing at low rates was
inconsistent with the Navy's commitment to manage programs
efficiently. The Navy countered with three arguments.
Firstly, as Admiral McDonald reasoned in 1983, closing down
production lines did not relieve the Navy of the requirement
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for replacement aircraft. Peacetime losses were inevitable;
they must be replaced to maintain the size of the force.
Force structure is dictated by the commitments made to our
allies as well as the considered judgement of the top
officials within the service. Therefore, closing production
lines against the advice of military planners was
unreconcilable with fulfilling the promise to defend the
United States' national security interests. Secondly, as
Secretary Lehman also argued in 1983, keeping uneconomical
production lines open was the price paid for surge
industrial capacity during wartime. Continuing uneconomical
production lines is not ideal, but the Navy argued that
investment in mobilization capability mitigated the
additional peacetime cost. Finally, the Navy concluded that
the A-6F acquisition incorporated features that offset other
weaknesses. Cost savings came early in the program through
competitive procurement of the engines and avionics and the
initiation of a firm fixed-price development contract.
Other savings were realized over the lifetime of the project
through commonality of systems with other aircraft and the
translation of improved reliability and maintainability
factors into the hardware designs.
Thus, the Navy used several strategies in program
design and justification to gain greater budget continuity
from Congress. The service assembled program strategy
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components in soliciting the legislature for political
support
.
3 . Avoiding Programmatic Dysfunction
The indications of eroded programmatic goals are
delay, underperf ormance, and cost growth. Political support
and funding are designed to prevent dysfunction. If the
symptoms of dysfunction develop, further strategies are
employed to arrest the spread of damage. The A-6F case
provides evidence of this circumstance.
After initial authorization and appropriation, the
Navy sought program survival, stability and freedom from
Congressional control. If the A-6F were terminated, there
would be no aircraft in the early 1990' s to bridge the gap
to the ATA. Therefore, survival quickly assumed paramount
importance, especially when Congress criticized excessive
numbers of open naval aircraft production lines producing at
low rates. The A-6E was still in procurement, but below the
economic production level. By inference, the A-6F would be
similarly branded by Congress as another indication of the
Navy's reluctance to manage its aircraft programs cost-
effectively. The legislature's threat to mandate closings
of production lines jeopardized the A-6F, although the
airplane was in Full Scale Engineering Development and
production was planned at economically sound levels.
At this point in the acquisition, the Navy solicited
support from other participants in the program
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implementation process. It sought OSD concurrence in
assessment of the nature of the threat to strike aircraft in
the 1990's and beyond, i.e., justifying the program's
inception relative to the combat capability of potential
adversaries. The service also sought support from the
Marine Corps because the A-6F would enter the Marine
inventory. Primarily, the Navy chose to emphasize
continuity with a prior policy choice by presenting the A-6F
as a variant of the A-6 strike aircraft first introduced in
1963.
Continuing production of the A-6E during development
of the A-6F illustrates a key point of the Navy's strategy
to market the program to Congress. The A-6F was billed as
evolutionary from the A-6E, rather than revolutionary. The
Navy intentionally did not label the aircraft as the A-6F
during budget deliberations for FY's 84 and 85. Instead,
the service referred to the plane as the A-6E Upgrade in all
documentation and testimony. Senators and Congressmen who
slipped into addressing the plane as the A-6F were politely
corrected [Ref. 68:Part 2:p. 197]. The unforeseen outcome
was that Congressmen and Senators associated both the
strengths and weaknesses of the A-6E program with the A-6F.
Depicting the aircraft simultaneously as new on the
attributes of maintainability and survivability, but old on
the attribute of technological risk created confusion in the
minds of Congressional decision makers. Which aircraft was
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being procured below economic production level? In November
1987, Senator Nunn continued to believe that the CBO report
of March 1987 proved the A-6F was unaffordable because its
predecessor had a history of low rates of production.
The Navy sought stability through a fixed-price
development contract with Grumman. An important element of
FFP contracts is their inherent resistance to modification.
The A-6F' s configuration was substantially frozen because of
the additional costs involved in renegotiation. Grumman was
similarly motivated to keep costs low because of the
harnessing of his profit incentive. Furthermore, the
technological risk was firmly set on the shoulders of the
contractor to develop the aircraft with the agreed measures
of performance. Simultaneous oscillation of price and
product performance was prevented.
The bonus attribute of an FFP contract is the
measure of protection from Congressional backsliding on its
production commitment. Congress was unlikely to renege on
providing funding for the A-6F because of substantial
termination costs. When Gramm-Rudman-Hol lings threatened to
upset that strategy, the Navy again initiated a
counter-strategy. The service informally requested Congress






Summary of Applying Model Criteria
The implementation model explains many of the
actions of participants in the A-6F acquisition. The Navy
assumed the prime position as owner and defender of the
project, assembling strategy elements to achieve funding and
political support. Congress participated in the process at
the price of controlling some of the outcomes. The Navy's
promotional strategies were carefully designed to avoid
perception of programmatic dysfunction.
B. ANSWERS TO THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS OF CHAPTER I
In Chapter I, four research questions were posed. The
following are the answers to these questions developed as a
result of the research project.
1 . What Is the Nature, Scope, and Intent of
Congressional Budget Control?
Chapter II presented Congressional control
mechanisms in detail and analyzed the most significant
characterizations. Budget controls are determined by
processes of authorization and appropriation, and augmented
by oversight activities. The authorization and
appropriation processes were found to be quite similar.
Both include hearing testimony in committee and subcommittee
from executive branch witnesses, budget bill mark-up,
committee reports, floor debate and initial vote, joint
conference votes, final floor votes and transmission to the
President. Oversight includes hearings, investigations by
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Congress, examination by "watchdog" agencies, and
requirement for submission of reports from CBO, GAO and the
executive branch. Problems with control include the
authorization/appropriation mismatch, delay in passage of
budget legislation, institutional conflict within Congress,
limited focus of budget review, duplication of effort,
micromanagement of executive budget implementation, and the
dissipation of energy in the diffusion of Congressional
power through its highly detailed annual review of the
budget
.
Congress exercises its control functions in the
context of its Constitutional position in the government.
However, there are other reasons for use of budget and
related controls, such as the perceived waste in executive
operations, recapturing policy initiative vis-a-vis the
executive, increasing complexity of issues, and advancing
the agendas of individual Members of Congress. Within the
definition of the implementation model developed in this
thesis. Congressional control is a fixed institutional
characteristic that must be confronted in the Navy's
strategy assembly process. Congress exacts a price for its
cooperation and involvement in implementing programs; the
surrender by the Navy to Congress of some control over
programmatic outcomes is partial payment of this price.
Avoidance of controls is an objective of executive branch
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agencies, which employ strategies to thwart their
imposition
.
2 . What Is the Nature, Scope, and Impact of the Navy's
Responses to Budget Control?
Chapter III outlined a model for understanding
implementation of policy and developed three criteria to
judge the effectiveness of Navy strategies in the A-6F
acquisition. Those criteria were tested and it was
concluded that the model accurately predicts elements of
strategy and politics in the attempted implementation of the
A-6F project.
As the Navy assembles its policy implementation
strategy, efforts to garner Congressional political support
and funding on favorable terms are expressed both in program
design, program justification, and direct involvement in the
deliberative process. The nature of the process is
political as the Navy bargains for advantage in budget
deliberations, attempting to assure program survival,
stability, and the avoidance of control. In program design,
it uses several strategies to demonstrate to Congress that
the service shares concern for af f ordabili ty and prevention
of waste. The Navy also exploits "pork barrel" politics to
portion out the benefits of defense contracts to gain
favorable votes in budget deliberations. In the area of
program justification, it continuously educates Congress to
the missions of the Navy, to the weapons systems used, and
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to the measures of effectiveness chosen to judge program
success (e.g., maintainability, reliability and
survivability). Through budgetary and financial
maneuvering, the Navy uses both reprogramming and
supplemental appropriations to guarantee program funding and
stability. It may attempt to persuade Congress by making
good faith attempts to remain in control of expenditures
when unforeseen circumstances derail the original budget
execution plan. In attempting to influence Congressional
deliberations directly, the Navy encourages a high level of
agency contact while simultaneously regulating the kind of
information exchanged.
What are the impacts of these responses? Are the
implementation strategies successful? Are the pitfalls of
delay, underperf ormance, and cost overruns avoided?
a. Delay
If the Navy loses the political skirmish on
Capitol Hill and a program is subsequently terminated, at a
minimum, a delay of the desired programmatic outcome is
certain. While political observers remark upon the "no
ninth inning" factor of policy formulation [Ref. 3:pp.
148-149] , the substantial effort for program designers and
planners to regroup and restructure proposals must be taken
into account. These activities take up time that could be
employed in policy implementation. Thus, there is
dissipation of Navy energy as programs are replaced,
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repackaged and remarketed to Congress. While postponement
is an outcome of the implementation process, it also is a
budget enactment tactic of both Congressional critics of
programs and Navy resistors to program modification. Under
either circumstance, continuity in policy formulation and
implementation is lost.
b. Underperf ormance
As discussed in Chapter III, underperf ormance
takes two forms: underestimation of technological risk
determining a boundary of physical performance, and
acceptance of less funding to insure program survival. The
latter leads to less than desired military capability either
directly through less flexibility to increase funding to
offset other weaknesses, or through program stretchouts that
result in fewer weapons procured. The intended achievement
of military capability for the A-6F was postponed by
Congressional action. The capability desired for the A-6F
will not be operational within the timeframe envisaged.
Moreover, the Navy is presented with little choice to
restructure a plan to overcome this failing. The service
appears justified in the perception that its independence to
pursue weapon acquisition programs was curtailed by both
Congress and OSD pressure.
c. Cost-overruns
The A-6F was not a victim of this dysfunction in
its design stage. But life-cycle cost estimates did
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escalate from $1 billion in 1983 to $6.5 billion in 1988.
The SASC cited this circumstance in justifying its position
on the aircraft's af fordabil i ty . The service would likely
stretch-out the procurement, perhaps reducing the planned
procurement to less than 150 planes. The SASC though it
likely that production rates would fall below the economic
level and the program would require diversion of funding
from more important areas such as the ATA. The Navy was
unable to answer this criticism satisfactorily.
There are many examples where strategies have
been employed unsuccessfully to attempting to avoid the
pitfall of cost-overruns. Recent illustrations include the
Army's Aquila Remotely Piloted Vehicle, the Navy's Fiscal
Year 1989 Submarine Combat System (FY89CS) , and the joint
Navy/Air Force Advanced Medium Range Air-To-Air Missile
(AMRAAM) [Ref. 4 3
: pp . 20, 62, 80]. The interlocking
constraints of performance, schedule and cost are evident in
these examples. If a performance parameter is less than
expected, the service must decide if restoration to the
desired level is required. If the answer is affirmative,
this decision often translates into increased expenditure
and lengthened production schedules. As costs mount, so
does Congressional criticism of program management; at times
the program is terminated.
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3. What Specific Responses Has the Navy Made to
Congressional Attempts to Influence the Management
of the A-6F Acquisition Program?
The Navy responded with a broad assault upon the
initial Congressional concern over multiple low turn-out
production lines. The service countered by demonstrating
that it shared the same concerns for financial savings. In
particular, the FFP contract, the life-cycle savings from
enhanced maintainability and reliability, the use of NDI and
the employment of commonality with other aircraft systems
were all features of the procurement program emphasized in
testimony.
The Navy justified the aircraft as necessary to
carry out defense policy objectives for strike warfare, to
bridge the operational gap to the new ATA. The changing
requirement for more A-6's in the carrier air wing was based
on the operational requirement to carry out strike missions.
Low production rate of naval aircraft similarly met policy
objectives to replace lost airplanes and provide for surge
production capacity in wartime.
When the A-6F was ready to transition to production,
the Navy initially tried to exploit the conflict between
Armed Forces and Appropriations Committees over the proposed
force structure and af f ordabili ty issues. But ambivalence
within the Navy concerning the primacy of the ATA program
prevented a vigorous argument to OSD. Secretary Carlucci
marked the aircraft from the proposed FY 89 budget as a
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result of loss of Congressional and OSD support, with the
apparent intention of effectively terminating the program.
4 . What Lessons Has the Navy Learned from Congressional
Review and Oversight of the A-6F Program?
The Navy concludes that the lack of a united DOD
position on the A-6F, the scarcity of budgetary resources,
and the meddling of Congress and other organizations spelled
the death of the program. An alternative perspective is
that the inability to effectively settle the production line
issue, to communicate to Congress and OSD the operational
requirement so as to make the plane seem affordable, and the
carry-over of weaknesses of the predecessor A-6E aircraft




Conclusions are grouped in three areas: those that
pertain to Congressional controls in general, those that
apply to Navy responses, and those concerning the A-6F
acquisition .
1 . Conclusions Regarding Congressional Control and
Their Use
a. The Dissipation of Energy
Congress dissipates its own and agency political
energy in attempting to control Executive budget and
implementation decisions. Endless rounds of negotiation,
bargaining and compromise appear at times not to lead to a
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coherent statement of national objectives that link
logically to past decisions. Rather, Congress often has a
foreshortened view of the future, the illusion of dealing
with long term concerns when occupied with short term
interests. At times energy is not channeled into careful
deliberation of the outputs of the budget, but is squandered
on haggling over inputs. Enhancing this characteristic are
the constraints of annual budgeting, demise of the seniority
system, the proliferation of committees seeking control, and
the overlay of new budget procedures upon the old. As long
as political energy is wasted in deliberations over resource
inputs, decisions will be delayed and resource decision
issues will be uncertain,
b. Opportunism
Congress is opportunistic and often ready to
advance the agendas of individual Members. Members and
staff scrutinize programs to exploit weaknesses, or
alternatively avoid weaknesses depending on their perceived
gains or losses. Program managers and administrators are
subjected to intense examination concerning operational
problems. The opportunistic nature of Congress leads to an
atmosphere of mistrust wherein participants in the policy
implementation process maneuver to avoid blame and
responsibility for programmatic outcomes.
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c. Unintended Consequences of Mi cromanagement
Congressional micromanagement leads to
unintended effects. As more of the budget is debated and
approved in highly detailed line item format. Members tend
to lose the perspective of national interest in seeking to
advance special constituent concerns. Major program and
policy issue debates are delayed and then become submerged
under mounds of budget data. Congress then complains that
it has not had enough time to adequately deliberate, passes
an Omnibus Appropriation Act, and leaves it to the Executive
to resolve mismatches in authorization and appropriations.
d. Fragmented Decision Making
Congress makes budget and control decisions in a
fragmented rather than unified manner. Differences between
committees are highlighted in line item review. Confusion
on the part of Executive agencies about Congressional
intentions occurs when mismatches in authorization and
appropriation are present. Agencies then attempt to exploit
the differences by playing Committees against each other.
Temporarily, program stability and survival may be assured
for another round of budget formulation. But, as in the
A-6F case, fragmentation provides the opportunity for other




Conclusions Regarding Navy Responses to
Congressional Control
a. Program Merits
Programs do not stand solely on their own
technical merits. The strongest technical justifications
must be matched with political strategies to withstand
buffeting pressures during budget deliberation and
enactment. The process is closely akin to a private sector
marketing effort, putting together the winning mix of price,
product, promotion, and distribution in the form of cost,
weapon performance, legislative selling points, and
geographic spreading of governmental largess. Surrounding
all of this strategy is the political atmosphere of
bargaining, persuasion and compromise wherein agencies and
individuals advance their own goals in tandem with
programmatic requirements.
b. Factors That Terminate Programs
Defense programs appear to be constrained or
terminated not by one overwhelming factor, but by a
combination of elements in the political process.
Congressional pressure to seek alternative policies can find
an ally to OSD reluctance to challenge Congressional
decisions. Alternatively, OSD' s desire to foster harmony
with Congress can oppose the Navy's desire to pursue an
independent course of action. In either case, OSD may step
out of its role as reviewer and defender of service programs
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to terminate policy implementations as an expression of its
unwillingness to arbitrate between the service and Congress,
as shown by the A-6F example.
Another factor is the growth trend of the
budget. In times of defense budget growth that is
sanctioned by all parties, programs are more likely to be
approved than denied. Alternatively, as budgets decrease,
the probability of uniform agreement collapses, in
accordance with the change of political agendas of some
participants
.
c. Measures of Programmatic Success
Acceptance of underperf ormance, delay and
escalating cost in relation to original intentions are
symptoms of programmatic dysfunction. Strategies are
developed to overcome these negative outcomes and measures
of programmatic success are tailored in relation to them.
As a result, effective programs are those that have been
around the longest, perform as anticipated, and do not
exceed cost projections. Executive agency focus, as well as
that of Congress, remains fixed upon input of resources
instead of upon output to national defense. The result is
distortion of the implementation process to reflect not the
measurement of policy outcomes, but the measurement of
inputs. Moreover, the opportunities for micromanagement




Conclusions Regarding the A-6F Case Example
a. The Implementation Process
The A-6F case illustrates the implementation
process as an assembling of strategy components to achieve
objectives. The Navy assumed the leading position,
soliciting the participation of OSD and Congress, OSD and
Congress then sought to control the terms of their
cooperation. The Navy employed several strategies to gain
their supportive participation, to overcome organizational
resistance, to retain its autonomy, and to insure
programmatic survival,
b. Specific Budget and Control Procedural Problems
The A-6F case illustrates problems of program
implementation decision procedures. The two-step
authorization-appropriation enactment of budgets leads to
Congressional micromanagement , fragmented decision making,
duplicative review, mismatch of legislation, limited focus,
and institutional conflict. The result of the Navy's
failure to overcome these difficulties is delay or inability
to introduce an aircraft that meets the established
operational requirement for an all-weather medium attack
airplane.
c. Program Implementation politics
The A-6F case illustrates the politics of
program implementation. program goals expand to include the
political agendas of the participants. Project stability
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and survival are more likely when congruence in political
goals is achieved. But, absolute agreement may not be
necessary if political support from one organization may be
used to offset or substitute for the opposition of another.
In the clash surrounding hegemony over Navy force structure
decisions, the Navy was unable to exploit its alliance with
the HAC. OSD then advanced its own objective to seek
greater political harmony with the SASC by terminating the
A-6F.
D. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
1
.
Application of the Policy Implementation Model to
Other Categories of Budget Execution
The suitability of the implementation model
developed in this study to describe other areas of budget
execution may be explored. This includes identification of
implementation strategies employed in programs within the
operations and maintenance accounts, the stock funds, and
the industrial funds. This research should provide further
insight to the political process of budget execution.
2 Developing a Normative Approach to Policy
Implementation
Through research to identify the components of
successful policy implementation, decision makers in the
Executive branch will be better able to structure programs
and marketing strategies. Furthermore, they may learn to
avoid the weaknesses that have led to programmatic failure.
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3. Expanding Research to Include the Influence of
Industry and Special Interest Groups in Policy
Implementation ~~~~
This thesis focused on a limited number of
participants in policy implementation. Other organizations,
including industry and special interest groups, play an
active role in shaping programs. Their contributions should




The Affects of Int ra-organ izat ional Relationships
Upon Program Implementation
The institutional conflict between Armed Services
and Appropriations Committees of Congress was discussed in
this thesis. Similarly, the Navy and OSD are large
organizations composed of smaller groups that wield
significant power in designing, justifying and implementing
policy initiatives. Further research to apply the
implementation model may improve its applicability and
advance the definition of proper intra-organizat ional
relationships in successful budget execution.
5 Examination of the Influence of Other Acquisition
Design Strategies Upon Program Implementation
This thesis examined only a few of the possible
strategies that may be employed in the design and
implementation of acquisition programs in the budget
process. Alternative strategies involving concurrency,
product warranties, cost analyses (e.g., design-to-cost,
should-cost, could-cost) , and preplanned product improvement
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also may be explored. Decision makers, armed with superior
information and strategies, will be better able to make
intelligent choices in constructing programs that address
both the political and operational concerns of participants
in the policy implementation process.
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APPENDIX A
SUBCOMMITTEE ALIGNMENT OF THE HOUSE AND SENATE
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APPENDIX B
CHRONOLOGY OF THE EXTENSION
OF ANNUAL AUTHORIZATION
TO DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS
1958 and prior--DOD appropriations permanently
authorized
.
1959--(PL 85-436) to require the annual authorization
for procurement of aircraft, missiles, and naval vessels.
1962--(PL 87-436) to require the authorization of
appropriations for research, development, test or evaluation
associated with aircraft, missiles, and naval vessels.
1963--(PL 88-174) to require the authorization of
appropriations for the procurement of tracked combat
vehicles
.
1967--(PL 90-168) to require the annual authorization of
the personnel strengths of each of the Selected Reserves.
1969--(PL 91-121) to require the authorization of
appropriations for the procurement of other weapons.
1970--(PL 91-441) to require the authorization of
appropriations for the procurement of torpedoes and related
support equipment and to require annual authorization of the
active duty personnel strengths of each component of the
Armed Forces.
1973--(PL 92-436) to require the annual authorization of
the average military training student loads of each
component of the Armed Forces.
1973--(PL 93-155) to require the annual authorization of
civilian end-strengths.
1975--(PL 94-106) to require the annual authorization of
military construction of ammunition facilities.
1977--(PL 95-91) to require the Armed Services
Committees with jurisdiction over the national defense
programs of the Department of Energy.
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1980--(PL 96-342) to require the annual authorization of
funds for operation and maintenance of the Department of
Defense and its components.
1982--(PL 97-86) to require the annual authorization of
appropriations of funds for the procurement of ammunition
and so-called "other" procurement.
1983
— (PL 98-94) to require the annual authorization of
appropriations for working-capital funds.
ADAPTED FROM: Committee on Armed Services, U. S. Senate
Staff Report 99-86, Defense Organization:





3 January President submits his budget
15 February CBO submits report to the
Budget Committees on alterna-
tive sources of revenue, budget
authority and outlays
25 February Authorizing and Appropriations
Committees submit views and
estimates to Budget Committees
1 April Senate Budget Committee reports
Concurrent Resolution to the
Senate
15 April Congress completes action on
concurrent resolution on the
budget
15 May Annual appropriations bills may
be considered in the House
10 June HAC reports last annual appro-
priations bill to the House
15 June Congress completes action on
reconciliation legislation
30 June House completes action on an-
nual appropriation bills
1 October New fiscal year begins
ADAPTED FROM: U. S. Senate Document 100-4, Standing Rules of
the Senate and Congressional Budget and
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ITEMS OF SPECIAL INTEREST
Navy Aviation
The conferees reviewed the Navy's plans in aviation
modernization in considerable detail. The conferees note
that there are serious af
f
ordabil i ty problems in Naval
aviation both in near and long term. Despite the fact the
Navy decided to accelerate the procurement of aircraft
carriers in fiscal year 1988, it chose to reduce the
procurement of combat aircraft. Compared to last year's five
year plan, this year's five year plan removed a third of all
planned procurement of combat aircraft. The Navy has many
combat aircraft in production at inefficient production
rates. While this situation is serious in its own right, it
is disastrous in the face of impending budget reductions.
The House and Senate took substantially different
approaches to solving these problems. The Senate reviewed
all programs and determined that there were insufficient
funds to support both an Advanced Technical Aircraft (ATA)
and a block upgrade version of the A-6, the A-6F. The Senate
fully funded the ATA and terminated the A-6F, primarily
because the A-6F is vulnerable due to its large radar cross
section. The ATA will be a survivable aircraft designed to
accomplish the same missions as the A-6.
The House determined that the A-6F should be fully funded
because the A-6 series aircraft is the Navy's only all
weather medium attack aircraft and is required over the next
five years to outfit air wings for expanded carrier force
structure. The House effectively terminated the ATA because
it determined that a major new program in not affordable in
the present budget situation, and because a delay in the
program might help resolve several technical uncertainties.
The House also terminated further procurement of the
Marine Corp's AV-8B light attack aircraft. The House
questioned whether the AV-8B offered sufficient military
value to justify the cost of continued procurement in an era
of shrinking defense budgets. The House concluded that its
limited payload, high maintenance requirements and lack of
radar, limit its combat utility. Further, the House noted
the Administration's plans to stretch out the production
rate starting in fiscal year 1990 adds four years to the
program and increases unit costs by as much as 80 percent
toward the end of the program.
After considerable negotiation, the conferees adopted the
following outline for the future of Navy aviation. First,
the conferees recommend full authorization for the Advanced
Tactical Aircraft. Second, the conferees terminated further
development or procurement of the F model of the A-6. The
conferees included a provision (sec. 112{f))which prohibits
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the Secretary of the Navy from obligating any funds for
purposes of developing or procuring an F model A-6.
In its place, the conferees recommend an authorization of
$376.6 million that is available at the discretion of the
Secretary of the Navy either to procure 11 E models of the
A-6, or to initiate a retrofit program for the existing
fleet of A-6s. The conferees emphasize that the Navy must at
some time initiate a program for upgrading the existing
fleet of A-6s, since those aircraft will have to remain in
Navy inventories for the next twenty years. The funds
provided this year, however, are available at the discretion
of the Secretary of the Navy either to initiate that upgrade
program or to procure E model A-6s. The conferees also
recommend an authorization of $475.5 million for 24 AV-8B
aircraft, including advance procurement for fiscal year
1989.
The conferees also direct the Navy to initiate a program
to develop a two-seat, all weather ground attack variant of
the F/A-18S, and provided $4 million to initiate that
upgrade program. The primary initial emphasis of this
program should go to improving the radar on the F/A-18s. The
Navy also should consider growth versions of the existing
engine that will enable it to meet the threat of the 1990's
and beyond. Once the two-seat F/A-18 becomes available, it
should be fielded with the Marine Corps initially, so that
the A-6s in the Marine Corps shall be freed to transfer to
Navy medium attack squadrons.
These programs figured prominently in the conferees
deliberations for funding at the contingency level. At the
contingent level, the conferees recommend termination of
both the A-6 program and the AV-8B program.
The conferees note that the Navy is facing long-term
serious financial constraints. It has too many combat
aircraft in production at inefficient production rates.
Further, several major new programs--such as the F-14D, the
V-22, the Long Range ASW Capable Aircraft (LRACA), and the
ATA will require substantial increases in funding in
upcoming years. In light of these financial constraints and
the need to preserve modernization, the conferees determined
that the A-6 and the AV-8B programs should be terminated at
the contingent funding level.
In order to maintain modernization at the contingent
funding level, the conferees direct the Navy to negotiate a
multiyear contract for purposes of procuring F/A-18
aircraft, at a rate of 84 aircraft per year. The conferees
note that section 2306 of title 10, United States Code,
requires stable configuration as a prerequisite for entering
into multiyear contracts. The conferees believe that the
Secretary of the Navy should enter into a multiyear contract
for the F/A-lSs even though the contract may cover both the
current version and the upgraded ground attack version. The
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conferees note that the multiyear contract for F-16s
involves both single seat and two-seat variants.
A-6E/F attack aircraft (Intruder)
The budget request contained $702.2 million for
procurement of 12 A-6F aircraft in fiscal year 1988, $109.9
million for advance procurement of 18 A-6f aircraft in
fiscal year 1989, and $41.1 million for procurement of
initial spares
.
The House bill would authorize the amounts requested. The
Senate amendment would deny authorization for the A-6F.
The conferees are concerned that new start procurement of
the A-6F, at the same time a significantly more capable
successor aircraft (advance Tactical Aircraft (ATA)) is
under development, is both unaffordable and inconsistent
with a declining defense budget.
Further, the conferees believe the Navy should consider
extending the service life and upgrading existing A-6
aircraft in lieu of continued A-6 procurement to more
cost-effectively satisfy midterm force level requirements.
Accordingly, authorization for A-6F aircraft is denied.
Instead, the conferees recommend authorization of $376.6
million to procure 11 A-6E aircraft in fiscal year 1988 and
$41.1 million for initial spares, or, $376.6 million to
begin a service life extension and upgrade program for
existing A-6 aircraft, whichever the Navy decides is most
benef i ci al
.
ADAPTED FROM; U. S. House of Representatives Report
100-446, National Defense Authorization Act
For Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989. Conference







INFORMATION ON DEFENSE ACTIVITIES
ANNUAL AVERAGE
1973-76 1977-80 1981-84
HEARINGS 407 496 456
COMMITTEES REQUESTING
HEARINGS 47 79 84
SECDEF APPEARANCES
AT HEARINGS 19 25 17















JUSTIFICATION BOOKS 11,927 16,636 22,734
SUMMARY OF INCREASES IN CONGRESSIONAL DIRECTIONS TO DOD
ANNUAL AVG
ANNUAL AVG INCREASE IN
NUMBER INCREASE IN PROVISIONS
FISCAL YEAR OF YEARS REPORTS/STUDIES IN LAW
1970-1982 13 14 36
1983-1986 4 88 115
ADAPTED FROM: GAO Report GAO/NSI AD-86-65BR , DOD Acquisition





MEMBERS OF THE DEFENSE ACQUISITION BOARD (DAB)
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition (Chair)
Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (Vice Chair)
Service Acquisition Executive, Ariny
Service Acquisition Executive, Navy
Service Acquisition Executive, Air Force
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Production and Logistics)
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Program Operations)
Director of Defense Research and Engineering
Director of Program Analysis and Evaluation
Chairs of Acquisition Committees, as appropriate.
SOURCE: Department of Defense Instruction 5000.49, Subj
Defense Acquisition Board, p , 2
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APPENDIX G
LESSONS LEARNED BY DOD WITNESSES
Politcal science is a contradiction in terms
On Capitol Hill, perceptions are realities. If Congress
perceives something, it is a fact.
Know your committees and how they are organized and
operate. No two are alike.
A staffer perceives a program and its program manager as
taking on the same character. A poor program reflects on
its manager, and vice versa.
Don't play games, waffle or be inconsistent with
something you or others have said previously.
Handle things promptly and quickly.
Respond equally as fast and efficiently to all Members
of Congress regardless of party or ideology. Even minority
Members wield influence on issues through networking and
committee work.
The bulk of public business does not take place in
public, such as hearings on the floor. Understand how
things are done.
Use language Members can understand. Avoid being too
technical or detailed unless specifically asked.
Be candid, truthful. Credibility is one of the program
manager's biggest assets on Capitol Hill.
Recognize there are a number who will probably vote
against defense most of the time, and a number who will vote
for. Some need to be convinced each time.
Congress doesn't really change the thrust of the DOD
budget. It plays on the margins with a little here and
there.
Don't be lead to believe the staff runs Congress, in
spite of what you see as their role and influence. The
Members do.
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RDT&E and procurement appropriations have
constituencies. (They make things.) Operations and
maintenance does not.
Be careful of what is written, especially if you write
it. Things have a way of getting to Capitol Hill.
Do it verbally when you can.
Don't go to Congress and spill your soul. Show
restraint, but do not hedge. It is easier to add
information than subtract.
Recognize the myriad agendas attempting to be carried
out: state, district, party, caucus, defense committee,
personal. Understand the motivations.
The military eyes cannot look for blacks and whites,
right and wrongs, all or nothing, as may be customary.
Tradeoffs and compromise form the basic political
process in Congress,
Let a sleeping dog lie if all is going well on your
program
.
The ideal situation for a program manager: nobody knows
he's there, and he gets what he asks for. Try to stay low,
work the system properly, and keep the right people
informed
.
SOURCE: Congressional Involvement and Relations. A Guide





PRODUCTION RATES OF SELECTED AIRCRAFT
AVG MIN MIN MAX
TYPE PRODUCTION SUSTAINING ECONOMIC ECONOMIC
AIRCRAFT RATE 1983-87 PRODUCTION PRODUCTION PRODUCTION
AV-8B 34 30 36 72
A-6E 8 6 12 72
F/A-18 84 36 84 145
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